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THE PUNISHMENT OF HATE: TOWARD A 
NORMATIVE THEORY OF BIAS· 
MOTIVATED CRIMES 
Frederick M. Lawrence* 
Implicit within every penal relation and every exercise of penal 
power there is a conception of social authority, of the (criminal) per-
son, and of the nature of the community or social order that punish-
ment protects and tries to re-create. t 
America, on the whole, has been a staunch defender of the right to 
be the same or different, although it has fallen short in many of its 
practices. The question before us is whether progress toward toler-
ance will continue, or whether, as in many regions of the world, a fatal 
retrogression will set in.2 
Most everyone agrees that bias crimes are a scourge on our soci-
ety and that the problem is getting worse.3 What is surprising in the 
face of this apparent consensus is the relative lack of focus on three 
critical underlying questions. First, what precisely distinguishes a 
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1. DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY 265 (1990). 
2. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 518 (1954). 
3. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2198 n.4 (1993) ("According to amici, 
bias-motivated violence is on the rise throughout the United States."); Robert J. Kelly et al., 
Hate Crimes: Victimizing the Stigmatized, in BIAs CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
AND LEGAL REsPONSES 23, 23-27 (Robert J. Kelly ed., 1993) (noting that the number of bias 
crimes is increasing); JACK LEVIN & JACK McDEvrrr, HATE CRIMES 232 (1993) (stating that 
hate crimes occur frequently in every region of the United States); ANTI-DEFAMATION 
LEAGUE, 1993 Aunrr OF ANTI-SEMmc INCIDENTS 1(1994) (finding that the total number of 
reported anti-Semitic incidents in 1993 represented an eight-percent increase from 1992 and 
was the second highest in the last 15 years); Klanwatch Reports Hate Violence At Record 
Levels Last Year, SPLC REP. (S. Poverty L. Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.), Apr. 1993, at 1 (report-
ing that 1992 was the "deadliest and most violent year since Klanwatch began tracking hate 
crimes in 1979"). But see GoVERNOR's TASK FoRCE ON HATE CRIMES, HATE CRIMES/HATE 
INCIDENTS IN MASSACHUSETTS: ANNUAL REPORT, 1992, at 8 (1993) (arguing that the in-
creased incidents of bias crimes may reflect improved reporting and heightened awareness of 
bias crimes rather than an actual rise in the number of bias crime occurrences). 
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bias crime4 from a similar crime committed without bias motivation 
- that is, a "parallel" crime?5 Second, why should a bias crime be 
punished more severely than a parallel crime? Third, under what 
circumstances is an individual guilty of a bias crime, as opposed to a 
parallel crime? This article addresses these questions, each of 
which has gone largely unexplored in the growing literature on bias 
crimes. 
Legal bias crime scholarship has focused on issues of hate 
speech,6 particularly in the university context,7 and on the tension 
4. Bias crimes are often referred to, particularly in the popular press, as "hate crimes." 
Although hate crimes is a powerfully evocative term, I reject it in favor of bias crimes, which 
captures more precisely what is at stake when we analyze bias-motivated violence. 
What is essential about bias-motivated violence is that the perpetrator is drawn to commit 
the offense by the victim's race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin. Many instances of 
personal, violent crimes may be motivated all or in part by hatred for the victim. If, however, 
there were no bias motivation, this conduct would not be considered a civil rights crime. See 
Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil 
Rights Crimes, 67 TuL. L. REv. 2113, 2117 n.5 (1993) [hereinafter Lawrence, Civil Rights and 
Criminal Wrongs] (discussing in part the over- and under-inclusiveness of the term hate 
crimes as applied to bias crimes); Frederick M. Lawrence, Resolving the Hate Grimes/Hate 
Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting Racist Speech, 68 NoTRE DAME L. 
REv. 673, 673-74 n.3 (1993) [hereinafter Lawrence, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox] 
(same). 
This observation about the critical role of "bias" and the subsidiary role of "hate" in 
understanding bias crimes is true under either the discriminatory selection model or the ra-
cial animus model. Both models are discussed infra at section I.A. 
5. A "parallel" crime involves the identical underlying criminal conduct as the civil rights 
crime without the bias motive. For example, a simple assault without the bias motivation is 
the parallel crime to a bias-motivated assault. See Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal 
Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2200-02. 
6. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of 
St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REv. 124, 151-60 (1992); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A 
Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 
(1982); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 287 (1990); David Kretzmer, Freedom of Speech and Racism, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 445 
(1987); Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 
32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: 
Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking 
First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 171 
(1990); Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 
(1991); R. George Wright, Racist Speech and the First Amendment, 9 Miss. C. L. REv. 1 
(1988); Symposium, Free Speech & Religious, Racial & Sexual Harassment, 32 WM. & MARY 
L. REv. 207 (1991); Symposium, Frontiers of Legal Thought: The New First Amendment, 
1990 DuKE LJ. 375; Symposium, Hate Speer;h and the First Amendment: On A Collision 
Course?, 37 V1u. L. REv. 723 (1992); Symposium, The State of Civil Liberties: Where Do We 
Go From Here?, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 309 (1992). 
7. See, e.g., Charles R. Calleros, Reconciliation of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties After 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: Free Speech, Multicultural Education, and Political Correctness at 
Arizana State University, 1992 UTAH L. REv. 1205; Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism 
Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991); Charles R. Law-
rence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DuKE LJ. 
431; Burt Neubome, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate Speech, 
27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 371 (1992); Ronald J. Rychlak, Civil Rights, Confederate Flags, 
and Political Correctness: Free Speech and Race Relations on Campus, 66 TuL. L. REv. 1411 
(1992); Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans on "Racist Speech:" The 
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between bias crimes and freedom of expression.8 Some scholars 
have explored the constitutionality of proposed federal bias crime 
legislation.9 Legal scholars have not, however, rigorously addressed 
the definition of bias crime, nor have they constructed a normative 
argument for enhanced punishment. At most, these authors have 
attempted to fine tune state or federal criminal statutes in order to 
make them more effective vehicles for punishing bias crimes.10 
Bias crime scholarship in such allied social sciences as sociology 
and criminal justice has primarily tended to describe either the legal 
responses to incidents of bias-motivated violence11 or the identify-
ing characteristics of the perpetrators of bias crimes and their vie-
View From Without and Within, 53 U. Pm. L. REv. 631 (1992); Suzanna Sherry, Speaking of 
Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 15 MINN. L. REv. 
933 (1991); Thomas W. Simon, Fighting Racism: Hate Speech Detours, 26 IND. L. REv. 411 
(1993); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 
DuKE LJ. 484; Symposium, Campus Hate Speech and the Constitution in the Aftermath of 
Doe v. University of Michigan, 37 WAYNE L. REv. 1309 (1991). 
8. See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, The Hate Speech Case: A Pyrrhic Victory for Freedom 
of Speech?, 21 HoFSTRA L. REv. 285 (1992); Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You 
in Jai~ but Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic 
Intimidation Laws, 39 UCLA L. REv. 333 (1991); David Goldberger, Hate Crime Laws and 
Their Impact on the First Amendment, 1992-1993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 569; john a. powell, 
Rights Talk/Free Speech and Equality, 1992-1993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 587; Jonathan David 
Selbin, Bashers Beware: The Continuing Constitutionality of Hate Crimes Statutes After 
R.A.V., 72 OR. L. REv. 157 (1993); Philip Weinberg, R.A.V. and Mitchell: Making Hate 
Crime a Trivial Pursuit, 25 CoNN. L. REv. 299 {1993); Wayne R. Allen, Note, Klan, Cloth and 
Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819 (1991); Eric J. 
Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Freestyle: The Constitutionality of Penalty En-
hancement for Bias Crimes, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 179 (1993); Symposium, Hate Crimes: Pro· 
priety, Practicality and Constitutionality, 1992-1993 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 483. I have expressed 
my own proposal for addressing and resolving the conflict between freedom of expression 
and bias crimes in Lawrence, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox, supra note 4. 
9. See, e.g., Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crime Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise?, 1992-
1993 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 485, 495-500; Charles H. Jones, Jr., An Argument for Federal Protec-
tion Against Racially Motivated Crimes: 18 U.S.C. § 241 and the Thirteenth Amendment, 21 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 689 (1986); Gregory L. Padgett, Comment, Racially Motivated 
Violence and Intimidation: Inadequate State Enforcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies, 
75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 103 (1984). 
10. See, e.g., Abraham Abramovsky, Bias Crime: A Call for Alternative Responses, 19 
FORDHAM URB. LJ. 875 (1992); Charles J. Hynes, Remarks Concerning Prosecution of Bias-
Related Crimes, 17 NovA L. REv. 1213 (1993); Vrrginia Nia Lee, Legislative Responses to 
Hate-Motivated Violence: The Massachusetts Experiences and Beyond, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REv. 287 (1990); Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character, or Group 
Terror?, 1992-1993 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 605; Michael A. Sandberg, Bias Crime: The Problems 
and the Remedies, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL REsPONSES, 
supra note 3, at 193; Tanya Kateri Hernandez, Note, Bias Crimes: Unconscious Racism in the 
Prosecution of "Racially Motivated Violence," 99 YALE LJ. 845 (1990); James Morsch, Com-
ment, The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes: The Argument Against Presumptions of Racial 
Motivation, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 659 (1991); Padgett, supra note 9, at 103; Note, 
Combatting Racial Violence: A Legislative Proposal, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1270 (1988). 
11. See, e.g., BIAs CRIME: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT REsPONSE (Nancy Taylor ed., 1991) 
(collecting essays by advocates, public officials, and criminologists discussing various aspects 
of the response by law enforcement to bias crimes); BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND LEGAL REsPONSES, supra note 3, at 21-189 (same). 
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tims.12 This body of work is of great value to the present project, 
which brings the studies of sociologists and criminologists to bear 
on the fundamental legal issues raised by bias crimes. 
This article explores how bias crimes differ from parallel crimes 
and why this distinction makes a crucial difference in our criminal 
law. Bias crimes differ from parallel crimes as a matter of both the 
resulting harm and the mental state of the offender. The nature of 
the injury sustained by the immediate victim of a bias crime exceeds 
the harm caused by a parallel crime. Moreover, bias crimes inflict a 
palpable harm on the broader target community of the crime as 
well as on society at large, while parallel crimes do not generally 
cause such widespread injury. 
The distinction between bias crimes and parallel crimes also 
concerns the perpetrator's state of mind and, specifically, his bias 
motivation toward his victim. The punishment of an individual of-
fender for the commission of a bias crime is warranted by the state 
of mind with which he acts. 
Part I of this article discusses the differences between bias 
crimes and parallel crimes. This Part explores the distinctiveness of 
perpetrators and victims of bias crimes along with the impact of 
bias crimes on the victim, the target community, and society as a 
whole. Section I.A begins with an analysis of the requisite mental 
state of the bias crime offender under current bias crime statutes. 
This analysis demonstrates that there are two somewhat overlap-
ping yet analytically distinct models of bias crimes. I refer to these 
models as the "discriminatory selection model" and the "racial ani-
mus model."13 
12. See, e.g., LEVIN & McDEvrrr, supra note 3, at 161. In their recent book, Professors 
Levin and McDevitt also address the response of law enforcement to the increased incidence 
of bias crimes. Id. at 159-205; see also Kelly et al., supra note 3, at 23-27. 
13. I use race in racial animus, or in such terms as racially motivated violence or racial 
intolerance, as a shorthand term for the classifications enumerated in a bias crime statute as 
the basis for either a bias crime or an enhanced sentence. Under virtually every bias crime 
law, this encompasses motivation based not only on the victim's race but also on the victim's 
color, ethnicity, religion, or national origin. In many states, the groups covered by bias crime 
laws include those distinguished by gender or sexual orientation as well. See, e.g., CAL. PE· 
NAL CoDE §§ 422.6, 422.7, 1170.75 (West Supp. 1994) (prohibiting bias crimes committed 
because of the victim's gender or sexual orientation); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-4001 (Supp. 
1994) (same); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-7.l(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992) (same); low A 
CoDE ANN. § 729A.l (West 1993) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:6.I(g) (Supp. 1993) 
(same); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.147b (West 1991) (prohibiting bias crimes committed 
because of the victim's gender); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 12.1-14-04 (1985) (same); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (Supp. 1993) (same); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 9A.36.080(1) (West 
Supp. 1994) (same); W. VA. CODE§ 61-6-21 (1992) (same). 
This article takes no position on the question of how broadly bias crime statutes should be 
drawn. For examples of scholarly work taking such positions, see Eric Rothschild, Recogniz-
ing Another Face of Hate Crimes: Rape As a Gender-Bias Crime, 4 Mn. J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL 
324 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 93:320 
The discriminatory selection model of bias crimes defines these 
crimes in terms of the perpetrator's discriminatory selection of his 
victim. Under this model, it is irrelevant why an offender selected 
his victim on the basis on race. It is sufficient that the offender did 
so. The discriminatory selection model of bias crimes has received 
particular attention recently because the Supreme Court upheld a 
statute based on this model last year in Wisconsin v. Mitchelf.14 Be-
cause Mitchell represents the constitutional authority for the enact-
ment of bias crime laws, the Wisconsin statute at issue in that case 
warrants close examination.15 The racial animus model of bias 
crimes defines these crimes on the basis of the perpetrator's animus 
toward the racial group of the victim and the centrality of this ani-
mus in the perpetrator's motivation for committing the crime. A 
number of states have employed this model in their bias crime stat-
utes.16 Many but not all cases of discriminatory victim selection are 
in fact also cases of racial animus.17 Given the differences that exist 
between these two models, any analysis of the punishment of bias 
lssuES 231, 262-85 (1993) (arguing that all rapes, with the possible exception of "acquain-
tance rape," are motivated by bias against women and should be treated as bias crimes); 
Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun ls Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title Ill of the Violence 
Against Women Act, 80 GEO. LJ. 2197, 2204-25 (1992) (arguing that all rapes should be 
treated as bias crimes); Anthony S. Winer, Hate Crimes, Homosexuals, and the Constitution, 
29 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 387, 428-38 (1994) (arguing that once a state adopts a bias crime 
statute, it is constitutionally obligated to include homosexuals as a protected group under 
that statute). I note, however, that the framework developed in this article would apply 
equally to gender and sexual orientation in those states that have enacted such provisions in 
their bias crime laws. 
14. 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2194-95 (1993). 
15. See infra text accompanying notes 19-60. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 61-72. Most state bias crime statutes are ambigu-
ous as to the required mental state of the perpetrator; that is, these statutes are susceptible of 
being construed as either racial animus model statutes or discriminatory selection statutes. 
See infra text accompanying notes 73-82. This article argues that if such ambiguity exists, 
courts should resolve it in favor of a racial-animus-model interpretation. See infra Part III. 
17. The distinction between the racial animus model and the discriminatory selection 
model of bias crimes will be discussed in depth infra in section I.A. It may prove helpful 
even at this introductory stage to provide several hypotheticals to help clarify the nature of 
this distinction. 
Consider a purse snatcher who preys exclusively upon women because he believes that he 
will better achieve his criminal goals grabbing purses from women than trying to pick wallets 
out of the pockets of men. The purse snatcher has discriminatorily selected his victims on the 
basis of gender, but he has not acted with animus toward women as a group. Similarly, 
consider the mugger who preys solely upon white victims because he believes that white 
people on balance carry more money than nonwhites. He too has selected his victim on the 
basis of race, but he has done so without bias motivation. These two hypotheticals provide 
examples of crimes fitting the discriminatory selection model but not the racial animus 
model. 
The hypothetical case of the purse snatcher will be addressed again in greater depth. See 
infra text accompanying notes 215, 217-18. 
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crimes must provide a clear understanding ()f what distinguishes 
bias crimes from other criminal behavior. 
Having established a typology of positive bias crime law in sec-
tion I.A, I discuss in section I.B the outward manifestations of these 
crimes. This discussion first addresses the nature of the conduct of 
the bias crime perpetrator. I then turn to the impact of bias crimes 
on three different levels: (i) the impact of bias crimes on the spe-
cific victim of the crime; (ii) the broader impact of bias crimes on 
the "target" group, that is, the racial group of which the victim is a 
member; and (iii) the impact of bias crimes on the general 
community. 
Part II demonstrates that bias crimes ought to be punished more 
severely than parallel crimes. I begin with an examination of the 
role of proportionality in criminal punishment. The proportionality 
of punishment to the seriousness of the crime is a critical aspect of 
the punishment theories of both retributivists and consequentialists. 
In order to determine the relative punishments for various crimes, 
there must be a means by which to measure the relative seriousness 
of those crimes. If the level of intentionality for two crimes is 
roughly the same - as is the case with an intentional assault and an 
intentional bias-motivated assault - the relative seriousness of the 
crimes is best measured by the harm caused. Although we cannot 
measure harm with arithmetic precision, much can be said to guide 
our understanding of harm. Finally, Part II applies the analysis of 
relative harms to the context of bias crimes, concluding that bias 
crimes warrant harsher punishment than parallel crimes. 
Part III considers the aspects of bias crimes that are relevant in 
the punishment of an individual offender. Whereas the harm 
caused by bias crimes generally justifies the enhanced punishment 
of these crimes, the resulting harm to a particular victim does not, 
in and of itself, warrant the enhanced punishment of the perpetra-
tor. Bias motivation of the perpetrator, and not necessarily the re-
sulting harm to the victim, is the critical factor in determining an 
individual's guilt for a bias crime. Part III concludes that the dis-
criminatory selection model of bias crimes, adopted by many states 
and upheld in Mitchell, fails to capture the essence of what consti-
tutes a bias crime.18 The racial animus model of bias crimes, on the 
other hand, offers a far richer theory and ought to be the focus of 
18. The approach that this article advocates would thus reopen the debate over the im-
pact of bias crime laws on freedom of expression. Opponents of bias crime laws have argued 
that it is unconstitutional to punish motivation in general and bias motivation in particular. 
See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 8, at 362-79. For reasons that I have discussed at length else-
where, see Lawrence, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox, supra note 4, I believe that this 
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the study of bias crimes. Discriminatory selection of a victim may 
often provide important evidence of racial animus, and in some in-
stances even fully persuasive evidence. But selection of victims 
ought to play the role of proof for animus and not the greater role 
of an element of the crime. 
I. How BIAS CRIMES ARE DISTINCT FROM PARALLEL CRIMES 
A. The Mental State of the Bias Crime Offender: The 
Discriminatory Selection Model and the Racial Animus 
Model of Bias Crimes 
A typology of bias crime laws19 properly begins with the Wis-
consin penalty enhancement law20 upheld by the Supreme Court in 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell. 21 Mitchell was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court expressly sustained a modem bias crime law.22 In a 
debate may properly be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of laws specifically punish· 
ing bias-motivated crimes. 
19. The number of states that are reported to have some form of bias crime statute varies. 
By some definitions of bias crime law, virtually every state has such a statute. See, e.g., LEVIN 
& McDEvrrr, supra note 3, at 186 ("Forty-seven states currently have some sort of hate 
crime legislation."); Joseph F. -Sullivan, Judges Hear 2 Bias Laws Assailed in Trenton, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 13, 1993, at B4 ("[Forty-six] states and the District of Columbia have enacted 
hate-crime statutes."). These include general intimidation, harassment, terrorism, and van· 
dalism statutes under which a bias crime could be presented. In this article, statutes desig-
nated as "bias crime statutes" include only those laws that make some explicit reference to 
race, eitl!er as to racial animus motivating the perpetrator or as to discriminatory selection of 
tl!e victim based on race. 
20. Bias crime laws may be divided into "pure bias crime" and "penalty enhancement" 
laws. I have argued elsewhere that this distinction is strictly descriptive and that these two 
forms of bias crime laws are identical for all analytic purposes. See Lawrence, Hate Crimes/ 
Hate Speech Paradox, supra note 4, at 695-98. Pure bias crimes include specified racially 
motivated behavior directed at a person or property. An example of a pure bias crime stat-
ute is the St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance that tl!e Supreme Court struck down in R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 {1992); tl!e ordinance prohibited conduct " 'which one knows 
or has reasonable grounds to know' " will cause " 'anger, alarm or resentment in others on 
tl!e basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.'" 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, 
MINN., LEGIS. CooE § 292.02 (1990)). Penalty enhancement laws increase the criminal sanc· 
tion - whetl!er fines, terms of incarceration, or botl! - for certain crimes when those crimes 
are committed with racial motivation. 
21. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
22. In Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 {1952), the Supreme Court upheld a group 
libel law punishing the dissemination of racially slanderous or inflammatory statements. 
Beauhamais was premised on tl!e idea tl!at just as libel of an individual falls outside the 
protection of the Frrst Amendment, group libel is similarly unprotected. 343 U.S. at 254-58, 
262-63. Beauhamais, however, was significantly undercut by New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 {1964) (holding that defamatory statements made against public 
officials will receive Frrst Amendment protection unless such statements were made with 
knowledge of tl!eir falsity or a reckless disregard for tl!e truth), and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969) (requiring the state to prove that speech constitutes incitement to 
"imminent lawless action" before the state may apply the criminal law to suppress it). Mitch-
ell is the first time that the modem Court, after Sullivan and Brandenburg, explicitly upheld a 
bias crime statute. 
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sense, the Mitchell case removed the constitutional shadow cast 
over bias crime statutes by R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul. 23 The penalty 
enhancement statute upheld in Mitchell was based on the discrimi-
natory selection model. The nature of this model was crucial to the 
manner in which the State of Wisconsin sought to distinguish its 
statute from the ordinance struck down in R.A. V. 24 As discussed 
below, the distinction between the discriminatory selection model 
and the racial animus model, so significant in the argument ad-
vanced by the State of Wisconsin, was largely lost in the Court's 
decision in Mitchell. Nonetheless, Mitchell must be seen both as a 
challenge to the Wisconsin statute itself and as a part of an ongoing 
judicial consideration of the constitutionality of bias crime laws. 
The events that gave rise to Mitchell took place on October 7, 
1989, in Kenosha, Wisconsin, when Todd Mitchell, a nineteen-year-
old black man, directed and encouraged a number of young black 
men and boys to attack a fourteen-year-old white boy, Gregory 
Riddick.25 Mitchell selected Riddick solely on the basis of his 
race.26 Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery for his role in 
the severe beating - a crime that carries a maximum sentence of 
two years under Wisconsin law.27 Mitchell's crime also implicated 
the Wisconsin bias crime statute, which provides for the enhanced 
penalty of racially motivated crimes.28 Under this statute, the po-
23. The decision in R.A. V. raised serious doubts as to the constitutionality of bias crime 
legislation generally. In response to anticipated future questions, for example, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation sent out a letter to over 16,000 local law enforcement agencies to 
inform them that the decision in R.A. V. did not affect their obligations to collect data under 
the Federal Hate Crimes Statistics Act of 1990. See Katia Hetter, Enforcers of Hate-Crime 
Laws Wary After High Court Ruling, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1992, at Bl. Mitchell was seen as 
resolving those doubts. See, e.g., Brian Levin, U.S. Supreme Court Upholds Stiffer Sentences 
for Hate Crimes, INTELLIGENCE REP. (S. Poverty L. Ctr., Montgomery, Ala.), Sept. 1993, at 4, 
4-5 (quoting law enforcement officials' approval of the decision in Mitchell); see also infra 
text accompanying notes 50-57. 
24. See Petitioner's Brief at 30-38, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-
515). 
25. 113 S. Ct. at 2196-97. 
26. The primary evidence that Mitchell selected Riddick because of Riddick's race was 
Mitchell's exhortation to the group directly before the attack. Mitchell asked, "Do you all 
feel hyped up to move on some white people?" He then said, "There goes a white boy; go 
get him." 113 S. Ct. at 2196-97. 
27. 113 S. Ct. at 2197; see Wis. STAT. §§ 939.05, 93950(3)(e), 940.19(1m) (1991-92) (pro-
viding a two-year sentence for complicity in aggravated battery). 
28. The bias crime statute provides: 
(1) If a person does all of the following, the penalties for the underlying crimes are 
increased as provided in sub. (2): 
(a) Commits a crime under chs. 939 to 948. 
(b) Intentionally selects the person against whom the crime under par. (a) is com-
mitted or selects the property that is damaged or otherwise affected by the crime under 
par. (a) in whole or in part because of the actor's belief or perception regarding the race, 
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person or 
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tential penalty for an aggravated battery is increased by five years if 
the perpetrator of the assault selected his victim on the basis of the 
victim's race.29 In addition to Mitchell's conviction for battery, he 
was also found to have acted out of racial bias in the selection of the 
victim.30 Mitchell, whose maximum possible sentence for this of-
fense was seven years, received a prison sentence of four years.31 
He challenged his conviction, claiming that the enhancement of his 
prison term was a violation of his right to freedom of expression 
under the First Amendment. The Wisconsin appellate court upheld 
the conviction, but that state's supreme court reversed.32 Ulti-
mately, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Mitchell's sentence, includ-
ing the enhanced portion.33 
When the Mitchell appeals were before the Wisconsin court, the 
conflict between bias crimes and freedom of expression was the 
central legal issue of concern for those who study and enforce bias 
crime laws.34 The legal debate was dominated by the Supreme 
Court's decision in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.35 In R.A. V., the 
Supreme Court unanimously struck down a municipal ordinance 
prohibiting cross burning and other actions "which one knows or 
has reasonable grounds to know" will cause "anger, alarm or re-
sentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
the owner or occupant of that property, whether or not the actor's belief or perception 
was correct. 
(2)(a) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a misdemeanor other than a 
Class A misdemeanor, the revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum 
period of imprisonment is one year in the county jail. 
(b) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a Class A misdemeanor, the 
penalty increase under this section changes the status of the crime to a felony and the 
revised maximum fine is $10,000 and the revised maximum period of imprisonment is 2 
years. 
(c) If the crime committed under sub. (1) is ordinarily a felony, the maximum fine 
prescribed by law may be increased by not more than $5,000 and the maximum period of 
imprisonment prescribed by law for the crime may be increased by not more than 5 
years. 
(3) This section provides for the enhancement of the penalties applicable for the un-
derlying crime. The court shall direct that the trier of fact find a special verdict as to all 
of the issues specified in sub. (1). 
(4) This section does not apply to any crime if proof of race, religion, color, disability, 
sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that crime. 
Wis. STAT. § 939.645 (1991-92). 
29. Wis. STAT. § 939.645(2)(c) (1991-92); Wis. STAT. §§ 939.05, 939.50(3)(c), 940.19(lm) 
(1991-92). 
30. 113 S. Ct. at 2197. 
31. 113 S. Ct. at 2197. 
32. State v. Mitchell, 473 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), revd., 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 
1992), revd., 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
33. 113 S. Ct. at 2196. 
34. See supra notes 6-8 (citing literature on the conflict between the regulation of racist 
speech or bias crimes and the protection of freedom of expression). 
35. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). 
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gender."36 Four Justices concurred in the judgment solely on the 
grounds of overbreadth.37 The majority of the Court reached fur-
ther and found that the St. Paul ordinance was an unconstitutional 
content-based regulation of speech.38 
The Court utilized a limited categorical approach to the First 
Amendment,39 accepting the argument that "fighting words," along 
with other categories of expression such as obscenity and defama-
tion, are not entitled to full First Amendment protection.40 These 
forms of expression nevertheless enjoy some limited protection and 
are not "entirely invisible to the Constitution."41 Within any of 
these categories, expression may be proscribed only on the basis of 
its categorical nature and not on the basis of its content.42 Expres-
sion either operates in the full light of the First Amendment or in 
the shadow of that amendment but never wholly outside its protec-
tion. 43 Regardless of the First Amendment status of a category of 
expression, content-based regulations are the greatest evil and are 
36. The St. Paul Bias·Motivated Crime Ordinance provided: 
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characteri-
zation or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which 
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct 
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 
112 s. a. at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CoDE § 292.02 (1990)). The defendant in 
R.A. V. had been charged under the ordinance for burning a cross on the lawn of an African-
American family who had recently moved into his neighborhood. 112 S. a. at 2541. 
37. Justice White wrote the main concurring opinion in which Justices Blackmun and 
O'Connor joined and Justice Stevens joined in relevant part. 112 S. a. at 2558-60 (White, J., 
concurring); see also 112 S. a. at 2561 (Blackmun, J., concurring); 112 S. Ct. at 2571 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring). It is safe to' assume that these Justices would have upheld a narrowly 
drawn bias crime statute. 
38. 112 s. a. at 2541-50. 
39. The categorical approach to First Amendment jurisprudence assigns certain forms 
and types of expression to categories that receive less protection than does general expres-
sion. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 
34 V AND. L. REv. 265, 307 (1981); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 
1986 DuKE LJ. 589, 601-08; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the 
First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20 (1975) (arguing that the categorical approach denies 
equal respect for all expression); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. 
REv. 591, 594-95 (1982) (stating that the general categorical methodology violates personal 
autonomy that is critical to the First Amendment); Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack On Categorical 
Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1983) (arguing that the categorical 
approach is inherently flawed as a First Amendment methodology); Geoffrey R. Stone, Re-
strictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restriction, 46 
U. Cttr. L. REv. 81 (1978) (attacking categories themselves as nonneutral and therefore in-
appropriate as a basis for determining First Amendment protection). 
40. 112 s. a. at 2543. 
41. 112 s. a. at 2543. 
42. 112 S. Ct. at 2543. 
43. 112 S. Ct. at 2543. 
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"presumptively invalid."44 The Court concluded that St. Paul had 
established a regulation aimed directly at racist speech and biased 
beliefs, rather than at "fighting words" generally or at a subgroup of 
fighting words selected for reasons other than the content of those 
words.45 In so doing, the ordinance impermissibly chose sides in 
the debate over racial or religious prejudice.46 
The reasoning in R.A. V. became the paradigm for courts re-
viewing bias crime statutes. This view was adopted, with some 
modification, by the Ohio Supreme Court47 and by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, the latter in its decision reversing the enhancement 
of Todd Mitchell's sentence for aggravated battery.4s Following the 
decision in R.A. V., the focus of attention among those who sought 
to enforce bias crime laws turned to limiting the reach of that case 
or distinguishing its holding from a particular statute.49 When the 
Supreme Court decided to hear Mitchell, 50 the critical issue to the 
44. 112 S. Ct. at 2542. 
45. 112 s. a. at 2547-48. 
46. 112 s. a. at 2549. 
47. See Ohio v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio 1992), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 
2954 (1993), affd. and reinstated in part, revd. and remanded in part, 624 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio 
1994). 
48. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 807-10 (Wis. 1992). The reasoning of the Court in 
R.A. V. formed the basis of two other state court decisions striking down state bias crime 
statutes. See State v. Sheldon, 629 A.2d 753 (Md. 1993); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 192 (Wash. 
1993). In addition, R.A. V. was central to the New Jersey Supreme Court oral argument in 
State v. Vawter, 627 A.2d 1123 (NJ. 1993), and State v. Mortimer, 627 A.2d 1124 (NJ. 1993) 
(challenging the constitutionality of the New Jersey bias crime laws). See Tony Hagen, Bias 
Laws Face Constitutional Probe at Court, NJ. LAW., Oct. 18, 1993, available in LEXIS, News 
Library, Njlawr file; Sullivan, supra note 19, at B4. 
Not every state court, however, has read R.A. V. as requiring the invalidation of its bias 
crime law. In State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992), the Supreme Court of Oregon 
upheld the Oregon racial intimidation law. This law makes it a crime for two or more per-
sons to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to another because of 
their perception of that person's race, color, religion, national origin, or sexual orientation. 
See OR. REv. STAT. § 166.165(1)(a)(A) (1993). The court concluded that the Oregon statute 
could be distinguished from the St. Paul ordinance struck down in R.A. V. because the St. 
Paul ordinance "was directed against the substance of speech," whereas the Oregon statute 
"was directed at conduct." 838 P.2d at 565; see also Dobbins v. Florida, 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding a sentence imposed under the Florida bias crimes statute). 
49. See, e.g., Steven M. Freeman, Hate Crimes: They're Still Against the Law, ADL ON 
FRONTLINE (Anti-Defamation League, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 1992, at 1, 4 (distinguishing 
the ordinance struck down in R.A. V. from the model statute endorsed by the Anti-Defama-
tion League). In Massachusetts, the State Attorney General convened a task force to reex-
amine the constitutionality of the Massachusetts civil rights crimes statutes in light of R.A. V. 
1993 MAss. ATrY. GEN., A SPECIAL REPORT REGARDING THE CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF 
MASSACHUSETI'S CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS (1993). 
50. State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 810 (1992). The 
Court granted certiorari because of the conflict between the Wisconsin and Ohio courts in 
Mitchell and Wyant, respectively, and the need to resolve the constitutionality of bias crime 
laws. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2198 & n.4 (1993). 
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parties was the applicability of R.A. V. to the Wisconsin penalty en-
hancement statute. 
In defending its bias crime statute against constitutional attack, 
the State of Wisconsin seized upon the precise form and content of 
that statute and the fact that it was a statute based on the discrimi-
natory selection model of bias crimes.51 The Wisconsin penalty en-
hancement law is the only explicit discriminatory selection model 
statute in the country. It expressly states that penalty enhancement 
is applicable if the offender "[i]ntentionally selects the person 
against whom the crime ... is committed ... because of ... the race, 
religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or an-
cestry of that person."52 The first clause of the relevant section of 
the provision, unique among American bias crime laws, requires 
"intentional selection" of the victim on the basis of race. This pro-
vided a key element in the State's argument that its statute with-
stood the holding in R.A. V. The State contended that R.A. V. was 
concerned with the regulation of expression;53 the Wisconsin bias 
crime statute proscribed not expression but conduct - the conduct 
of intentional discriminatory selection of a victim.54 
The focus on the discriminatory selection aspect of the Wiscon-
sin statute was not just an attempt to frame the statute on the per-
missible side of the line between the regulation of speech and that 
of conduct; it was also designed to defend the bias crime statute 
from the claim that it punished "motivation." The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in Mitchell had held that the Wisconsin bias crime 
law impermissibly strayed beyond the punishment of act and pur-
51. Petitioner's Brief at 29-31, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993} (No. 92-515). 
52. Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1}(b} (1991}. The full text of the Wisconsin penalty enhance-
ment statute is reprinted supra in note 28. 
53. Petitioner's Brief at 36-38, Mitchell (No. 92-515). 
54. The purported dichotomy between speech and conduct has been soundly criticized as 
a distinction that is inherently flawed and thus without analytic value as a tool in constitu-
tional analysis. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1482, 1494-96 
(1975); Lawrence, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox, supra note 4, at 691-94; Melville B. 
Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. R.Ev. 29 
(1973). Nevertheless, the distinction continues to play a substantial role in Frrst Amendment 
jurisprudence. This is particularly true in the debate over the constitutionality of bias crime 
laws. See, e.g., R.A.V., 112 S. a. at 2546 ("[A] particular content-based subcategory of a 
proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute di-
rected at conduct rather than speech."}; State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 565 (Or. 1992} (dis-
tinguishing the Oregon statute from the St. Paul ordinance struck down in R.A. V. on grounds 
that the St. Paul ordinance "was directed against the substance of speech," whereas the Ore-
gon statute "was directed at conduct"). The Supreme Court in Mitchell distinguished R.A. V. 
by pointing to the difference between speech and conduct. See 113 S. Ct. at 2201 ("[W]hereas 
the ordinance struck down in R.A. V. was explicitly directed at expression •.. the statute in 
this case is aimed at conduct unprotected by the First Amendment.''). 
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poseful intent and went on to punish motivation.ss In order to por-
tray the statute as punishing something other than motivation, the 
State argued that Mitchell's discriminatory selection of Riddick be-
cause of Riddick's race was wholly distinct from whatever Mitch-
ell's actual motivation for doing so may have been.s6 According to 
the State, Mitchell may have been motivated by Riddick's race or 
merely by the desire to show off in front of his friends, but so long 
as Mitchell chose Riddick on the basis of his race, his conduct trig-
gered the Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute.s7 
Ironically, although the State of Wisconsin was successful in de-
fending the constitutionality of its bias crime statute, it was unsuc-
cessful in explaining the nature of the discriminatory selection 
model to the Court. For that matter, the State failed to persuade 
the Court that the distinction between discriminatory selection and 
other models of bias crimes was relevant to the Court's considera-
tion of the issue. On the one hand, the Court understood Mitchell's 
sentence to have been enhanced because he "intentionally selected 
his victim on account of the victim's race. "SB This appears to be 
consistent with the State's construction of its statute. But elsewhere 
the Court described the Wisconsin bias crime penalty enhancement 
law as one that "punishes criminal conduct [but also] enhances the 
maximum penalty for conduct motivated by a discriminatory point 
of view more severely than the same conduct engaged in for some 
other reason or for no reason at all. "S9 Here, the understanding of 
the elements of the bias crime seems to tum less on the strict dis-
criminatory selection of a victim than on the point of view that un-
derpins that selection. 
The Court's lack of focus on the specific nature of the bias crime 
statute under review in Mitchell perhaps stemmed from the fact that 
it was not persuaded by the argument that the statute impermissibly 
55. "Because all of the (parallel] crimes are already punishable, all that remains is an 
additional punishment for the defendant's motive in selecting the victim. The punishment of 
the defendant's bigoted motive by the hate crimes statute directly implicates and encroaches 
upon First Amendment rights." 485 N.W.2d at 812. The Ohio Supreme Court reached es· 
sentially the same conclusion in Ohio v.Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 457-59 (Ohio 1992). 
56. Petitioner's Brief at 36-37, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515). 
57. Id. at 37. During his argument to the Supreme Court in support of the Wisconsin 
statute, State Attorney General James Doyle stated that the statute would have applied to 
Todd Mitchell if his sole motivation in selecting a white victim had been to impress his friends 
and if Mitchell himself had been otherwise indifferent as to the choice of his victim. nan-
script of Oral Argument at 9-10, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (No. 92-515). 
58. 113 S. Ct. at 2196. 
59. 113 S. Ct. at 2199 (emphasis added). 
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punished motive rather than conduct or intent.60 The exact nature 
of the motivation being punished was therefore not deemed to be 
of great relevance. Had the Court focused on the statute itself, it 
would have seen that the bias crime law it was upholding was di-
rected solely at the discriminatory selection of the victim. 
The Wisconsin statute may be contrasted with state statutes that 
target the racist motivation of the bias crime offender. These are 
statutes of the racial animus model. New Jersey, for example, en-
hances the criminal penalty for a crime that is motivated, at least in 
part, by "ill will, hatred or bias toward, and with a purpose to intim-
idate, an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, 
religion, sexual orientation or ethniCity."61 The elements of a bias 
crime in Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Florida, and New 
Hampshire also include hatred toward the victim's race and not 
mere discriminatory selection of that victim.62 Other states have 
statutes that, although less explicit as to the role of animus in a bias 
crime, implicitly require the existence of racial animus for criminal 
60. 113 S. Ct. at 2199-200 (rejecting the argument that the statute impermissibly punishes 
motive because the "defendant's motive for committing the offense is one important factor" 
in the sentencing and because "motive plays the same role under the Wisconsin statute as it 
does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which we have previously upheld 
against constitutional challenge"). 
61. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1994). 
62. Connecticut law provides that a person is "guilty of intimidation based on bigotry or 
bias if such person maliciously, and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person 
because of such other person's race, religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation," causes or 
threatens injury or damage to property. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18lb (West Supp. 
1994) (emphasis added). Maryland law provides for both an animus standard and a discrimi-
natory selection standard. Under the animus standard, "a person may not ... [h]arass or 
commit a crime upon a person or damage the ... property of a person ... [w]here there is 
evidence that exhibits animosity on the part of the person committing the act against a person 
or group because of that person's or group's race, color, religious beliefs, or national origin." 
Mo. CooE ANN., CruM. LAw § 470A (Supp.1993) (emphasis added). Under the discrimina-
tory selection model, no person may "[h]arass or commit a crime upon a person or damage 
the ... property of ... [a] person because of that person's race, color, religious beliefs, or 
national origin." Mo. CooE ANN., CruM. LAW§ 470A (Supp. 1993). Under Pennsylvania 
law, an offender commits "ethnic intimidation if, with malicious intention toward the race, 
color, religion or national origin of another individual," he causes injury or damage to that 
individual's property. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2710(a) (1983) (emphasis added). "Malicious 
intention" is defined as "the intention to commit [an] act motivated by hatred toward the 
race, color, religion, or national origin of another individual." 18 PA. CoNs. STAT.§ 2710(c) 
(1983). Under Florida law, the "penalty for any felony or misdemeanor shall be [enhanced] 
if the commission of such felony or misdemeanor evidences prejudice based on the race, 
color, ancestry, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, or national origin of the victim." FLA. 
STAT. ch. 775.085(1) (1993) (emphasis added). New Hampshire's bias crime statute provides 
for an extended term of imprisonment when the offender was "substantially motivated to 
commit the crime because of hostility towards the victim's religion, race, creed, sexual orien-
tation, national origin, or sex." N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 651:6(I)(g) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis 
added). 
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conduct to be a bias crime.63 The racial animus model of bias 
crimes is the one that bias crime scholars64 and law enforcement 
agencies6s most typically adopt. This model is consonant with the 
classical understanding of prejudice as involving more than differ-
ential treatment on the basis of the victim's race. This understand-
ing of prejudice, as reflected in the racial animus model of bias 
crimes, requires that the offender have committed the crime with 
some measure of hostility toward the victim's racial group or 
toward the victim because he is part of that group. 66 
The racial animus model of bias crimes is well illustrated by the 
regulations promulgated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) to implement the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990.67 These 
63. Massachusetts law criminalizes assault or battery that is committed upon a person for 
"the purpose of intimidation because of said person's race, color, religion, or national origin." 
MAss. GEN. L. ch. 265, § 39 (1992). Massachusetts law defines hate crime as "any criminal act 
coupled with overt actions motivated by bigotry and bias." MAss. GEN. L. ch. 22C, § 32 
(1992) (emphasis added). Vermont law provides for increased criminal penalties for any per-
son who commits a crime "and whose conduct is maliciously motivated by the victim's actual 
or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, age, service in the armed 
forces of the United States, handicap ... or sexual orientation." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 1455 (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). 
64. See, e.g., LEVIN & McDEvrrr, supra note 3, at 33-44 (analyzing the rise in bigotry as 
the root cause for the rise in bias crimes); Abramovsky, supra note 10, at 878 (stating that 
"(b]ias crimes are also microcosmic expressions of deeply rooted schisms and social intoler-
ance"); Brian Levin, Bias Crimes: A Theoretical and Practical Overview, STAN. L. & POLY. 
REv., Wmter 1992-93, at 165, 166 (arguing that bias crimes are motivated by prejudice and 
bigotry); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Bias Crimes: What Do Haters Deserve?, CRIM. JuST. ETH1cs, 
Summer/Fall 1992, at 20, 22 (defining hate criminals as "those who assault or harass from 
motives of racial hatred"). 
65. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF 1NVE5TIGATION, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, HATE CRIME 
DATA CoLLEcnON GuJDELJNES 4 (1990) [hereinafter FBI, HATE CruME DATA] (defining a 
bias crime as a "criminal offense against a person or property which is motivated, in whole or 
in part, by the offender's bias against a race, religion, ethnic/national origin group, or sexual 
orientation group"); Boston Police Department Community Disorders Unit Manual (defin-
ing a bias crime as a crime "motivated by 'hatred against a victim based on his or her race, 
religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or national origin.' " (Although the Boston Police De-
partment Manual attributes its definition of bias crime to the Federal Hate Crime Statistics 
Act, the Manual's language does not conform with that of the Act.)). 
66. The classic definition of prejudice remains that proposed forty years ago by Gordon 
Allport. He argued that "[e]thnic prejudice is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible 
generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or 
toward an individual because he is a member of that group." ALLPORT, supra note 2, at 9. 
67. FBI, HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 65, at 4; see also Hate Crime Statistics Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. V 1993) (directing the Attorney General to acquire data and create 
guidelines with respect to bias crimes). States have implemented the mandate of the Hate 
Crime Statistics Act through legislation and regulations. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 22C 
§§ 32-35 (1992) (Massachusetts state "Hate Crimes Reporting Act" passed in compliance 
with the federal directive); MAss. REos. CooE tit. 520, §§ 13.00-.08 (1992) (implementing 
regulations based upon those promulgated by the FBI); Telephone Interview with Richard 
W. Cole, Attorney General, Chief of Civil Rights Division, Attorney General's Office of 
Massachusetts (Jan. 3, 1995). 
The FBI implementing regulations refer to bias crimes as "hate crimes." For the reasons 
discussed supra in note 4, the term bias crimes is used here. The terminology used in this 
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regulations define a bias crime as criminal conduct motivated in 
whole or in part by "bias" - that is, "[a] preformed negative opin-
ion or attitude toward a group of persons based on their race, reli-
gion, ethnicity/national origin, or sexual orientation."68 The 
regulations provide for a set of "bias indicators" to guide the classi-
fication of a particular crime as a bias crime. These bias indicators 
primarily involve direct evidence of racial animus on the part of the 
offender.69 Some of the indicators are consistent with a discrimina-
tory selection model of bias crimes,7° and others are equally consis-
article is hardly dissonant with the thrust of the FBI regulations. Indeed, the FBI defines 
hate crime as "[s]ame as 'bias crime.'" FBI, HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 65, at 2; see also 
MAss. REas. ConE tit. 520, § 13.02 (1992). 
68. FBI, HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 65, at 4. The essential role of animosity in the 
racial animus model appears even more clearly in the Massachusetts regulations promulgated 
under the state "Hate Crimes Reporting Act." The Massachusetts regulations define a bias 
crime as conduct in which "[h]atred, hostility, or negative attitudes towards or prejudice 
against, any group or individual on account of race, religion, ethnicity, handicap, or sexual 
orientation ..• is a contributing factor, in whole or in part, in the commission of a criminal 
act." MAss. REas. ConE tit. 520, § 13.02 (1992). 
69. The list of bias indicators in the FBI regulations provides, in part, as follows: 
(b) Bias-related oral comments, written statements, or gestures were made by the 
offender which indicate his/her bias. For example, the offender shouted a racial epithet 
at the victim. 
(c) Bias-related drawings, markings, symbols, or graffiti were left at the crime 
scene. For example, a swastika was painted on the door of a synagogue. 
(d) Certain objects, items, or things which indicate bias were used (e.g., the offend-
ers wore white sheets with hoods covering their faces) or left behind by the offender(s) 
(e.g., a burning cross was left in front of the victim's residence). 
(h) A substantial portion of the community where the crime occurred perceives 
that the incident was motivated by bias. 
(i) The victim was engaged in activities promoting his/her racial, religious, ethnic/ 
national origin, or sexual orientation group. For example, the victim is a member of the 
NAACP, participated in gay rights demonstrations, etc. 
(1) There were indications that a hate group [defined in animus-based terms as a 
group which promotes "animosity, hostility, and malice" against a target group] was in-
volved. For example, a hate group claimed responsibility for the crime or was active in 
the neighborhood. 
(m) A historically established animosity exists between the victim's group and the 
offender's group. 
(n) The victim, although not a member of the targeted racial, religious, ethnic/na-
tional origin, or sexual orientation group, is a member of an advocacy group supporting 
the precepts of the victim group. 
FBI, HATE CRIME DATA, supra note 65, at 2-3, 5. 
70. 
(a) The offender and the victim were of different racial, religious, ethnic/national 
origin, or sexual orientation groups. For example, the victim was black and the offenders 
were white. 
(e) The victim is a member of a racial, religious, ethnic/national origin, or sexual 
orientation group which is overwhelmingly outnumbered by members of another group 
in the neighborhood where the victim lives and the incident took place. 
(g) Several incidents have occurred in the same locality, at or about the same time, 
and the victims are all of the same racial, religious, ethnic/national origin, or sexual ori-
entation group. 
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tent with either model.71 What distinguishes the FBI definition 
from a discriminatory selection model such as that utilized in Wis-
consin, however, is the manner in which the FBI regulations use 
indicators of discriminatory selection. The only relevance of a dis-
criminatory selection criterion to the FBI is to allow for the infer-
ence of animus.72 In this manner, the FBI regulations are distinct 
from the Wisconsin model. For purposes of the FBI regulations, 
discriminatory selection of a victim, in and of itself, is irrelevant to 
the identification of conduct as a bias crime. Discriminatory selec-
tion of a victim becomes relevant only if that selection is probative 
of an underlying racial animus. 
The discriminatory selection model represented by the Wiscon-
sin penalty enhancement statute and the racial animus model 
adopted by the FBI - and enacted by such states as Florida, New 
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Maryland 
- are two distinct models of bias crime laws. The majority of bias 
crime statutes, however, cannot be unambiguously placed in one 
category or the other. Of those states that punish bias crimes in a 
manner distinct from the general punishment of the relevant paral-
lel crime, the majority have employed neither the "intentionally 
selects" language of Wisconsin nor the "ill will, hatred, or bias due 
to race" language of New Jersey. California, for example, provides 
for the enhancement of criminal penalties for certain crimes if the 
defendant commits the crime "because of the [victim's] race, color, 
religion, ~ncestry, national origin, or sexual orientation."73 
Id. at 2-3. 
71. 
(f) The victim was visiting a neighborhood where previous hate crimes had beeri 
committed against other members of his/her racial, religious, ethnic/national origin, or 
sexual orientation group and where tensions remain high against his/her group. 
0) The incident coincided with a holiday relating to, or a date of particular signifi-
cance to, a racial, religious, ethnic/national origin, handicap, or sexual orientation group 
(e.g., Martin Luther King Day, Rosh Hashanah, etc.). 
(k) The offender was previously involved in a similar hate crime or is a member of 
a hate group. 
Id. at 3. 
72. The purpose of the FBI bias crimes reporting regulations is to aid in the identification 
of criminal acts in which "a bias motive" was a "contributing factor." The FBI defines bias 
solely in racial animus model terms, as a "preformed negative opinion or attitude toward" 
the target group. Id. at 4. The FBI provides a list of examples to aid in the process of 
determining whether a bias motive exists - that is, facts that are "supportive of a finding of 
bias." Id. at 2-3. Thus, even those indicators that are consistent with a discriminatory selec-
tion model of bias crimes are relevant under the FBI regulations only for the purpose of 
recognizing racial animus in the offender. 
73. CAL. PENAL CooE § 422.6 (West Supp. 1994) ("[No person may] willfully injure, in-
timidate, or interfere with, oppress, or threaten any other person in the free exercise or en-
joyment of any right .•• because of the other person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national 
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The because of or by reason of formulation has been adopted in 
some form by most states with bias crime laws. Many of these 
states have enacted simple because of bias crime statutes. Such stat-
utes require only that the defendant act with the mens rea for. the 
parallel crime and that the crime be committed "because of" the 
victim's race.74 This is also the formulation utilized in federal civil 
origin, disability, gender, or sexual orientation." (emphasis added)); CAL. PENAL CoDE 
§ 422.7 (West 1991) (providing that punishment for certain racially motivated crimes not 
otherwise covered by § 422.6 be enhanced over the punishment ordinarily provided for those 
crimes). 
74. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-9-121(2) (1993) (providing that "[a] person commits eth-
nic intimidation if, with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that 
person's race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin," that person causes or places an-
other in fear of personal injury or damage to property (emphasis added)); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 
38, para. 12-7.1 (1991) (providing that a person commits a hate crime when, "by reason of the 
race, color, creed, religion, ancestry, gender, sexual orientation, physical or mental disability, 
or national origin of another individual," that person commits certain specified crimes) (em-
phasis added)); lowA CoDE ANN. § 729A2 (West 1992) (defining a hate crime as a crime 
"committed against a person or a person's property because of the person's race, color, reli-
gion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual orientation, age, or disability"); 
lowA CooE ANN.§ 712.9 (West 1993) (enhancing penalties for hate crimes committed in 
Iowa); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17.1523 (Michie 1992) (providing for the reporting of bias 
crimes that appear to be "caused as a result of or reasonably related to race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin"); Mo. CooE ANN., CRIM. LAw § 470A (Supp. 1993) (providing that 
no person may "[h]arass or commit a crime upon a person or damage the ... property of ... 
[a] person because of that person's race, color, religious beliefs, or national origin"); MrCH. 
CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 28.257a (West 1994) (requiring the reporting of crimes "motivated by 
prejudice or bias based upon race, ethnic origin, religion, gender or sexual orientation"); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231(4) (West Supp. 1993) (criminalizing an assault committed "be-
cause of the victim's or another's actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orienta-
tion, disability ••. age, or national origin"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 574.090(1) (Supp. 1993) 
(providing that a person commits "the crime of ethnic intimidation in the first degree if, by 
reason of any motive relating to the race, color, religion, or national origin of another indi-
vidual or group of individuals," that person damages another's property above a set value or 
engages in certain unlawful uses of weapons); MoNT. CooE ANN. § 45-5-221(1) (1993) (pro-
viding that a person commits the offense of "malicious intimidation or harassment when, 
because of another person's race, creed, religion, color, national origin, or involvement in 
civil rights or human rights activities, he purposely or knowingly, with the intent to terrify, 
intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy or offend[,]" causes bodily injury or damage to property); 
MoNT. CooE ANN.§ 45-5-222 (1993) (enhancing sentences for person committing malicious 
intimidation or harassment); NEv. REv. STAT. § 207.185 (1991) (providing that an aggravat-
ing factor of a misdemeanor is that the offense was committed "by reason of the actual or 
perceived race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation of another person or 
group of persons"); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 240.31(McKinney1989) (enhancing the penalty for 
aggravated harassments committed "with intent to harass, annoy, threaten or alarm another 
person, because of the race, color, religion or national origin of such person"); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 14-401.14(a) (1993) (providing that a person commits ethnic intimidation if "because 
of race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin, [the offender] assault[s] another per-
son, or damage[s] or deface[s] the property of another person or threatens to do any such 
act"); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-3(c) (1993) (enhancing the penalty for misdemeanors "commit-
ted because of the victim's race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin"); N.D. 
CENT. CooE § 12.1-14-04(1-2) (1985) (providing that a person is guilty of a misdemeanor if 
he "[i]njures, intimidates, or interferes with another because of his sex, race, color, religion, 
or national origin in order to intimidate"); Omo REv. CooE ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992) 
(providing that a person commits ethnic intimidation if he commits a parallel crime "by rea-
son of the race, color, religion, or national origin of another person or group of persons"); 
OR. REv. STAT. § 166.155 (1993) (providing that a person commits "the crime of intimidation 
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rights crimes statutes.75 Other states augment this because of 
element of the bias crime with the additional element of 
"maliciousness. "76 
in the second degree" if he intentionally injures, damages the property of, or intimidates 
another person "because of that person's perception of the other's race, color, religion, na-
tional origin or sexual orientation"); VA. CoDE ANN.§ 8.01-42.l (Michie 1992) {providing 
that an action for injunctive relief or civil damages, or both, shall lie against any person who 
intimidates, harasses, or injures another person, or vandalizes his real or personal property, 
"where such acts are motivated by racial, or ethnic, animosity"); W. VA. CODE § 61-6-21 
{1992) (providing that a person will be guilty of a felony if he does or attempts to threaten, 
injure, or intimidate another person "because of such other person's race, color, religion, 
ancestry, national origin, political affiliation or sex"). 
75. The recently enacted crime bill directs the U.S. Sentencing Commission to promul-
gate guidelines enhancing the penalties for federal crimes in which the "defendant intention-
ally selects a victim ... because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person." Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096. 
In addition, there are federal proscriptions against racially motivated criminal interfer-
ence with certain protected rights and certain racially motivated crimes that are committed 
under color of law. See Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2116-18 
(classifying bias crimes as one of three categories of civil rights crimes, the others being crimi-
nal interference with certain protected rights - "rights interference crimes" - and crimes 
committed under color of law - "official crimes"). Thus, federal law prohibits the use of 
force or intimidation against a victim because of the victim's race and because the victim is 
engaged in one of certain enumerated activities, 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2) {1988), and also pros-
cribes disparate punishment of persons based on race or national origin, 18 U.S.C. § 242 
(1988). 
These two federal criminal statutes each use the because of formulation in defining the 
bias element of their respective crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 {1988) (punishing "[w]hoever, 
under color of any law ..• subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District ••. to 
different punishments, pains, or penalties on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by 
reason of his color or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens" (emphasis 
added)); 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (punishing "[w]hoever ••. willfully injures, intimidates, or inter-
feres with ... any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because he 
is or has been" engaging in one of a number of protected activities, including serving on a 
state jury, attending public school, or using a public accommodation (emphasis added)). 
76. See lDAHo CoDE § 18-7902 (1987) (providing that a person commits "malicious har-
assment" when causing injury or property damage "maliciously and with the specific intent to 
intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, color, religion, ancestry, or 
national origin"); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 750.147b {West 1991) (providing that a person 
commits "ethnic intimidation" if that person causes injury or property damage "maliciously, 
and with specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's race, 
color, religion, gender, or national origin"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 850 {1991) (providing that 
a person commits "malicious intimidation or harassment because of race," if he "maliciously 
and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that person's 
race [a]ssau!t[s] or batter[s] another person ... [or] [d]amage[s] ... any property of another 
person[] or ..• [t]hreaten[s], by word or act, to do any [of the above] acts"); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 11-42-3 (Supp. 1993) (providing that a person commits "[e]thnic or religious intimidation" 
if that person "threatens any injury to the person, reputation or property of another with the 
intent to terrorize that person by reason of their race, religion or national origin"); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS§ 11-5-13 {Supp. 1993) {defining a "[f]elony bias-motivated assault" as an "assault or 
battery •.. committed for the purpose of intimidation because of the victim's gender, race, 
color, religion, national origin, handicap, or sexual orientation"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
§ 22-19B-1 (Supp. 1994) (criminalizing "[a]ctions constituting harassment" where a person 
"maliciously and with the specific intent to intimidate or harass another person because of 
that person's race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin ... [c]ause[s] physical injury to 
another person ... [or] [d]eface[s] any real or personal property of another person ... [or] 
[d]amage[s] ••. any ..• property of another person[] or .•. [t)hreaten[s] by word or act, to do 
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Because of bias crime statutes - either in the simple form or 
with the additional element of maliciousness - evade easy classifi-
cation as either racial animus or discriminatory selection laws. 
These statutes make no explicit reference to either animus or dis-
criminatory selection. Yet several observations are possible. The 
simple because of model is most consistent with a discriminatory 
selection model.77 Because of language is more typically found in 
civil statutes than criminal proscriptions and, in the civil rights con-
text, is concerned with an actor's discriminatory choice rather than 
his reasons for making this choice.78 The because of formulation 
that requires maliciousness does suggest a greater concern with the 
motivation of the offender. Even this formulation, however, is con-
sistent with the discriminatory selection model and has been inter-
preted in this manner.79 But because of statutes are also not 
inconsistent with the racial animus model. These laws do not ex-
plicitly refer to the discriminatory selection of a victim and thus 
permit a court to interpret a mental state requirement that an of-
the acts prohibited"); WASH. REv. CooE § 9A.36.080 (1992) (providing that "[a] person is 
guilty of malicious harassment if he maliciously and with intent to intimidate or harass an-
other person because of ... that person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or ... 
handicap ... [c]auses physical injury to another person ... [or] places another person in 
reasonable fear of harm to his person or property ... [or] [c]auses physical damage to ... the 
property of another person"). 
77. See, e.g., State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 560, 563 (Or. 1992) (construing the phrase 
"intentionally causes physical injury [to a victim] ... because of" the victim's race in OR. 
REv. STAT.§ 166.165(1)(a)(A) (1993) as a proscription against targeting a victim on the basis 
of the victim's race, and stating that "one need not hate at all to commit this crime"). 
78. In the employment discrimination context, Title VII utilizes a because of formulation 
that in no manner requires racial animus on the part of the employer. Title VII provides, "It 
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ..• to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) 
(emphasis added). In fact, because of under Title VII is sufficiently removed from animus to 
include acts solely because of their discriminatory impact on a protected class. See, e.g., 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that an employer violates Title VII 
by implementing an employment practice perpetuating past patterns of purposeful discrimi-
nation, even if the employer has no present intent to discriminate). Similarly, discriminatory 
intent for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause should depend on neither animus nor 
conscious awareness of discrimination. See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the 
Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 935, 956-59 (1989). 
79. The Washington Supreme Court recently construed a because of statute that required 
maliciousness as a discriminatory selection statute. See State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 
1993). The Washington bias crime statute under review in Talley provided that a person was 
guilty of malicious harassment if he caused personal injury or damage to another's property 
"maliciously and with the intent to intimidate or harass another person because of that per-
son's race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or mental, physical, or sensory handicap." 
WASH. REv. CooE .ANN.§ 9A.36.080 (West Supp. 1994). The Washington Supreme Court 
understood the statute to deal strictly with the discriminatory selection of a victim by the 
offender. It stated that "[t]he statute punishes the selection of the victim, not the reason for 
the selection .•.• The statute is triggered by victim selection regardless of the actor's motives 
or beliefs." 858 P.2d at 222. 
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fender have acted because of the race of the victim as a mens rea 
requirement of racial animus.80 
Classification of because of bias crime statutes is thus made diffi-
cult by the fact that these laws are consistent with either the dis-
criminatory selection model or the racial animus model. Moreover, 
few of these laws have received definitive judicial construction.st 
Thus, these statutes as yet may not be classified as examples of 
either the discriminatory selection model or the racial animus 
model.82 
There is one additional category of bias crime laws worthy of 
examination in this discussion of the mental state of the bias crime 
offender: statutes treating institutional vandalism. Many states 
have statutes that specifically punish disturbance of religious con-
gregations or defacement and destruction of such institutions as 
houses of worship, cemeteries, or religious schools.s3 Institutional 
80. See, e.g., State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 453 {Ohio 1992) (construing a penalty en-
hancement statute using the language " 'by reason of the race, color, religion, or national 
origin of another person' " as requiring racial animus and stating that "the enhanced penalty 
re~;ults solely from the actor's reason for acting, or his motive" (quoting OHIO REv. CooE 
ANN. § 2927.12 (Baldwin 1992))). 
81. The only state bias crime laws that utilize a because of formulation that have been 
definitively construed by the highest court of that state are those of Ohio, Oregon, and Wash-
ington. See Wyant, 597 N.E.2d at 453; Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563; Talley, 858 P.2d at 217. 
82. Proponents of bias crime laws, apparently unaware of the potential ambiguity of the 
language used in bias crime statutes, have shown little interest in resolving the ambiguity. 
The recently enacted legislation that enhances criminal penalties for bias crimes provides a 
good example. The legislation, as eventually enacted, uses because of language and the 
discriminatory-selection-model formula. A hate crime is defined as "a crime in which the 
defendant intentionally selects a victim, or in the case of a property crime, the property that 
is the object of the crime, because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national 
origin, ethnicity, gender, disability, or sexual orientation of any person." Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796, 2096. 
By contrast, Senator Diane Feinstein, the chief sponsor of the bill, argued for its passage 
using language that clearly reflects the racial animus model. She said that "[s)omeone who 
selects a victim of a crime based on bigotry and hatred, should be subject to the stiffest 
penalties." 139 CoNo. REc. Sl3176 {daily ed. Oct. 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). 
The purpose of the argument in Part III of this article is thus twofold. First, newly en-
acted bias crime statutes ought to be based upon the racial animus model. Second, judges 
and prosecutors interpreting statutes that are susceptible of construction in terms of either 
the discriminatory selection model or the racial animus model ought to adopt the latter. See 
infra Part III. 
83. See, e.g., ALA. CooE § 13A-11-12{a){l) {1994) (providing that a person "commits the 
crime of desecration of venerated objects if he intentionally desecrates any public monument 
or structure or place of worship or burial"); Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1604(A){l) {1989) 
(providing that a person "commits aggravated criminal damage by intentionally or recklessly 
... defacing ... place[s] used for worship or any religious purpose"); GA. CooE. ANN.§ 16-7-
26 {1992) (criminalizing the malicious defacement of "a church, synagogue, or other place of 
public religious worship"); HAw. REv. STAT.§ 711-1107{l)(b) (1994) (criminalizing the dese-
cration of a "place of worship or burial"); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-225 (West 1986) 
(criminalizing the knowing defacement of "[a)ny church, synagogue, or other building, struc-
ture, or place used for religious worship or other religious purpose"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 17-A, § 507 (West 1964) (criminalizing the desecration of "any place of worship or bur-
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vandalism statutes do not require animus on the part of the of-
fender, only knowledge that the institution attacked or defaced was 
in fact one protected by the law. With one exception, these statutes 
are discriminatory selection model statutes.84 
The landscape of state bias crime law thus consists of a few stat-
utes falling clearly within the discriminatory selection model or the 
racial animus model and a substantial number of bias crime laws 
that are ambiguous as to what they punish. Only one state, Wiscon-
sin, has adopted an explicit discriminatory selection statute gov-
erning bias crimes against the person, although virtually all state 
institutional vandalism laws are of this model. Only five states have 
explicitly adopted the racial animus model. The balance of states 
with bias crime laws are not clear as to what models they employ. 
Part III of this article returns to the ambiguity created by the 
two models of bias crimes and the resulting lack of clarity in state 
bias crime statutes. I argue that the racial animus model is prefera-
ble and that states should either abandon discriminatory selection 
as a model for bias crimes or recognize that cases of discriminatory 
selection in the absence of racial animus present defendants who 
are less blameworthy than cases involving criminals who act out of 
racial animus. 
ial"}; Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 97-17-39 (Supp. 1993) (criminalizing the defacement of churches or 
cemeteries); Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 97-35-17 (1972) (criminalizing the disturbance of "any con-
gregation of persons lawfully assembled for religious worship"); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 30-15-4 
(Michie 1978) (criminalizing the desecration of any place of religious worship}; S.C. CoDE 
ANN.§ 16-17-520 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (criminalizing the disturbance of "any meeting, society, 
assembly or congregation convened for the purpose of religious worship"); VA. CoDE ANN. 
§ 18.2-423.1 (Michie 1988) (making it "unlawful for any person ... with the intent of intimi-
dating another person or group of persons, to place or cause to be placed a swastika on any 
church, synagogue or other building or place used for religious worship"); VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 18.2-423 (Michie 1988) (making it "unlawful for any person ... with the intent of intimidat-
ing any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of 
another"). 
84. I classify institutional vandalism statutes as discriminatory selection laws because the 
cases brought under these statutes ordinarily involve an actor who selects his target because 
of the racial or religious nature of the institution. These laws, however, if strictly read, allow 
for a finding of guilt based on a much lower showing of culpability by the actor. So long as 
the actor knows that the institution he defaces is a church or synagogue, it matters neither 
whether he was motivated by religious animus nor whether he selected the institution for that 
reason. This standard goes beyond not only the racial animus model but the discriminatory 
selection model as well. As a practical matter, however, knowledge of the religious nature of 
the institution that is vandalized is deemed to be a surrogate for discriminatory selection of 
that institution because of its religious identification. So understood, these are discrimina-
tory selection statutes. 
There is only one exception to this general rule. The Virginia institutional vandalism 
statute requires not only that the offender know the nature of the institution that he attacks 
but also that he act with racial or religious animus. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.01-42.1 (Michie 
1992) (providing for action for injunctive relief or civil damages against violence or vandalism 
"where such acts are motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic animosity"). 
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Before reaching that part of the discussion, I tum to the impact 
and effect of bias crimes. Section I.B describes the uniqueness of 
bias crimes. Part II argues that the distinguishing characteristics of 
bias crimes justify the enhanced punishment of these crimes. 
B. The Outward Manifestations of Bias Crimes: 
The Offender's Conduct and the Effect of Bias Crimes 
1. The General Nature of the Bias Crime and Its 
Impact on the Victim 
Recent sociological and criminological research allow us to be-
gin to paint a picture of bias crimes collectively85 and to distinguish 
these crimes from parallel crimes collectively. For the moment, it is 
helpful to understand these empirical findings, not in terms of any 
conclusions that might emerge, but in a purely descriptive sense. 
The normative implications of these descriptive findings will be ad-
dressed in Part II. 
Bias crimes are far more likely to be violent than are other 
crimes. This is true on two levels. In the first place, a crime com-
mitted with bias motivation is dramatically more likely to be an as-
sault than is a parallel crime.86 Secondly, bias-motivated assaults 
are between two and three times more likely than other assaults to 
involve physical injury to the victim.87 As opposed to the perpetra-
tors of other crimes, perpetrators of bias crimes are more likely to 
be strangers to their victims, as they have focused exclusively on 
race in selecting the victim.88 This fungibility of victims to the bias-
85. The data upon which much of the discussion in this section relies are somewhat lim· 
ited. Nonetheless, the conclusions that sociologists and criminologists studying bias crimes 
have drawn to date are consistent and are a very helpful point of departure for present pur-
poses. The mandate of the Hate Crime Statistics Act, 28 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. V 1993), will 
hopefully lead to further empirical studies of bias crimes, enhancing the opportunity for 
meaningful legal analysis in this area. The 1993 bias crimes report by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation was based on information submitted by 6850 of the nation's approximately 
16,000 law enforcement agencies. Because compliance under the Act is voluntary, the Act's 
effectiveness as an information-gathering vehicle appears to be extremely limited. See Levin, 
supra note 64, at 171. Although the compliance figures for 1993 represent a dramatic im· 
provement over the 3000 agencies reporting in 1992, they still demonstrate a compliance 
record of only 41 %. 
86. See LEVIN & McDEVITI, supra note 3, at 11 (noting that while only seven percent of 
all crimes reported to police involve assaults, approximately half of all bias crimes are as· 
saults); see also Levin, supra note 64, at 166. 
87. LEVIN & McDEVITI, supra note 3, at 11-12. 
88. Id. at 13 (relying on certain studies to conclude that while approximately 60% of all 
crimes are co=itted upon strangers, approximately 85% of the incidents of bias crimes are 
committed against strangers); see, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Black Youth Acquitted in Hasidic 
Jew's Slaying in Crown Heights Riot, WASH. PoST, Oct. 30, 1992, at A3 (describing how the 
killing of Yanke! Rosenbaum in Crown Heights was committed by a mob looking to exact 
vengeance against a "Jew" for the accidental vehicular killing of a black child by a Hasidic 
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motivated criminal is so integral to the bias crime that courts have 
looked to it as a critical element for identifying bias crimes.89 Bias 
crimes are also distinguishable as a group from parallel crimes 
based on the number of perpetrators. Bias crimes are significantly 
more likely than other crimes to be committed by groups and not 
by individuals.9o 
Bias crimes are also distinct from parallel crimes in terms of 
their particular emotional and psychological impact on the victim. 
The victim of a bias crime is not attacked for a random reason - as 
is the person injured during a shooting spree in a public place -
nor is he attacked for an impersonal reason - as is the victim of a 
mugging for money. Moreover, the bias crime victim cannot rea-
sonably minimize the risks of future attacks because he is unable to 
change the characteristic that made him a victim. 
Bias crimes give rise to a heightened sense of vulnerability be-
yond that normally found in crime victims. Bias crime victims have 
been compared to rape victims, in that the physical harm associated 
with the crime, however great, is less significant than the powerful 
accompanying emotional sense of violation.91 The victims of bias 
crimes thus tend to experience psychological symptoms such as de-
pression or withdrawal, as well as feelings of anxiety and helpless-
ness and a profound sense of isolation.92 One study of violence in 
the workplace found that victims of bias-motivated violence re-
Jew); The Effects of Hate: A Partial List of Hate Crimes Reported Across the Country in 
Recent Months, DET. FREE PRESS, Jan. 18, 1993, at SA (describing various recent incidents in 
which only the victim's race seemed important to the criminal, or in which the victim was 
chosen as a representative of a certain racial group, including the case of a Hispanic man who 
killed two black men because his ex-girlfriend had dated black men). Even the cross burning 
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), was directed not at the victim family qua 
individuals but rather as an African-American family who had recently moved into the 
predominantly white neighborhood in St. Paul where the incident took place. See 112 S. Ct. 
at 2541; David G. Savage, Hate Crime Law Is Struck Down, L.A. TIMES, June 23, 1993, at Al. 
89. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 372, 378-79 (Ct. App. 1994) (relying on the 
defendant's indifference to the personal selection of the victim as persuasive evidence of bias 
motivation), opinion superseded by 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 794 (1994). 
90. See LEVIN & McDEvrrr, supra note 3, at 16 (citing crime survey statistics illustrating 
that while approximately 25% of all crimes are committed by more than one perpetrator, 
over 60% of bias crimes are committed by more than one perpetrator). 
91. See Joan C. Weiss, Ethnoviolence: Impact Upon and Response of Victims and the 
Community, in BIAS CruME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LEGAL RESPONSES, supra 
note 3, at 174, 182. 
92. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 64, at 166; Weiss, supra note 91, at 182-83; Melinda Henne-
berger, For Bias Crimes, a Double Trauma, NEWSDAY, Jan. 9, 1992, at 113; N.R. Kleinfield, 
Bias Crimes Hold Steady, But Leave Many Scars, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1992, at Al, B2. 
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ported a significantly greater level of negative psycho-physiological 
symptoms than did victims of non-bias-motivated violence.93 
The markedly increased symptomatology among bias crime vic-
tims exists regardless of the race of the victim. The psychological 
trauma of being singled out because of one's race exists for white 
victims as well as for members of minority groups.94 This is not to 
suggest, however, that there is no difference between bias crimes 
committed by white perpetrators against people of color and bias 
crimes in which the victim is white, as in Wisconsin v. Mitchell. 95 A 
difference exists between black and Hispanic victims and white vic-
tims concerning a second set of factors - that is, defensive behav-
ioral changes. These data suggest that although bias crimes 
directed at minority victims do not produce a greater level of psy-
chological damage than those aimed at white victims, they do cause 
minority bias crime victims to adopt a relatively more defensive be-
havioral posture than white victims of bias crimes typically adopt.96 
The additional impact of a bias-motivated attack on a minority 
victim is not solely due to the fact that the victim was selected be-
cause of an immutable characteristic. This much is true for all vic-
tims of bias crimes. Rather, the very nature of the bias motivation 
when directed against minority victims triggers the history and so-
cial context of prejudice and prejudicial violence against the victim 
and his group. The bias component of bias crimes committed 
against minority group members is not merely prejudice per se but 
prejudice against a member of a historically oppressed group. In a 
similar vein, Charles Lawrence, in distinguishing racist speech from 
otherwise offensive words, described racist speech as words that 
"evoke in you all of the millions of cultural lessons regarding your 
inferiority that you have so painstakingly repressed, and imprint 
upon you a badge of servitude and subservience for all the world to 
see."97 Minority victims of bias crimes therefore experience the at-
93. Joan C. Weiss et al., Ethnoviolence at Work, J. INTERGROUP REL., Winter 1991-92, at 
28-29. 
94. Id. at 29-30. The data collected for the study of bias-motivated violence at work were 
analyzed by ethnicity. There was no statistically significant difference among whites, blacks, 
and Hispanics in the average number of psychological symptoms experienced as a result of 
being the victim of bias-motivated violence. Id. at 29. Moreover, the rates of reported 
"ethnoviolent victimization" between whites and blacks in the study were approximately the 
same. Id. at 23. 
95. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
96. Weiss et al., supra note 93, at 29. Included among the several factors used to measure 
defensive behavior were staying home at night more often, watching children more closely, 
trying to be "less visible," and moving to another neighborhood. Id. at 27-28. 
97. Lawrence, supra note 7, at 461. 
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tack as a form of violence that manifests racial stigmatization and 
its resulting harms. 
Stigmatization of this type has been shown to bring about humil-
iation, isolation, and self-hatred.98 An individual who has been ra-
cially stigmatized will often be hypersensitive in anticipation of 
contact with other members of society whom he sees as "normal" 
and will even suffer a kind of self-doubt that negatively affects his 
relationships with members of his own group.99 The stigmatized in-
dividual may experience clinical symptoms such as high blood pres-
sure100 or increased use of narcotics and alcohol.101 In addition, 
stigmatization may present itself in such social symptoms as an ap-
proach to parenting that undercuts the child's self-esteem and per-
petuates an expectation of social failure.102 All these symptoms 
may result from the stigmatization that comes even from nonviolent 
prejudice. Nonviolent prejudice carries with it the clear message 
that the target and his group are of marginal value and could be 
subjected to even greater indignities, such as violence that is moti-
vated by the prejudice.103 An even more serious presentation of 
these harms results when the potential for physical harm is realized 
in the form of the violent prejudice represented by bias crimes. 
2. The Impact of Bias Crimes on the Target Community 
The impact of bias crimes reaches beyond the harm to the im-
mediate victim or victims of the criminal behavior. There is a more 
widespread impact on the "target community" - that is, the com-
munity that shares the race, religion, or ethnicity of the victim -
and an even broader-based harm to the general society. 
Members of the target community of a bias crime experience 
that crime in a manner that has no equivalent in the public response 
to a parallel crime. Not only does the reaction of the target com-
98. Delgado, supra note 6, at 136-37. 
99. See, e.g., ALLPORT, supra note 2, at 150-53; ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 7-17, 130-35 
(1963); ROBERT M. PAGE, STIGMA 1-24 (1984); Harold W. Stevenson & Edward C. Stewart, 
A Developmental Study of Racial Awareness in Young Children, 29 CHILD DEV. 399, 408 
{1958). 
100. See Ernest Harburg et al., Socio-Ecological Stress, Suppressed Hostility, Skin Color, 
and Black-White Male Blood Pressure: Detroit, 35 PSYCHOSOMATIC MEo. 276, 277-78, 290-93 
{1973). 
101. See KENNETH CLARK, DARK GHETio 90-97 (1965). 
102. See IRWIN KATZ, STIGMA: A SOCIAL PsYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 102-17 (1981); 
HARRY H.L. KrrANo, RACE RELATIONS 125-26 {1974); Ari Kiev, Psychiatric Disorders in 
Minority Groups, in PSYCHOLOGY AND RACE 416, 420-22 (Peter Watson ed., 1973). 
103. Cf. ALLPORT, supra note 2, at 57-59 {discussing the progression of prejudicial action 
from "antilocution" to discrimination to violence). 
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munity go beyond mere sympathy with the immediate bias crime 
victim, but it exceeds empathy as well.104 Members of the target 
community of a bias crime perceive that crime as if it were an at-
tack on themselves directly and individually. Consider the burning 
of a cross on the lawn of an African-American family or the 
spraypainting of swastikas and hateful graffiti on the home of a 
Jewish family. Others might associate themselves with the injuries 
to these families, experience feelings of anger or hurt, and thus 
sympathize with the victims. Still others might find that these 
crimes trigger feelings similar to the sense of victimization and at-
tack felt by victims and thus empathize with the victims. The reac-
tions of members of the target community, however, will transcend 
both empathy and sympathy. Members of the target community 
experience reactions of actual threat and attack from this very 
event. Bias crimes spread fear and intimidation beyond the imme-
diate victims and their friends and families to those who share only 
racial characteristics with the victims.105 This additional harm of a 
personalized threat felt by persons other than the immediate vic-
tims of the bias crime differentiates a bias crime from a parallel 
crime and makes the former more harmful to society. 
This sense of victimization on the part of the target community 
leads to yet another social harm uniquely caused by bias crimes: 
the target community's response of fear, apprehension, and anger 
may be directed at the group with which the immediate offenders 
are, rightfully or wrongfully, identified.106 In addition to generating 
the generalized concern and anger over lawlessness and the per-
ceived ineffectuality of law enforcement that often follows a paral-
lel crime, a single bias crime may ignite intercommunity tensions 
that may be of high intensity and of long-standing duration.101 
104. See, e.g., MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLU-
SION, AND AMERICAN LAw 221 (1990) {highlighting the importance of empathy in combating 
discrimination in the United States). 
105. See, e.g., ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS 262-63 {2d ed. 1990); LEVIN & McDEV· 
rrr, supra note 3, at 234; Kelly et al., supra note 3, at 26; Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2330-31; cf. 
ROBERT ELIAS, THE PoLmCS OF VICTIMIZATION 118 (1986) (discussing the feelings of fear 
that violent nonbias crimes cause nonvictims to experience). 
106. Compare the situations in which groups are rightfully identified with the immediate 
offenders {for example, the association of a bias crime offender who is a member of a skin-
head organization with other members of that organization) with situations in which the 
identification between group and offender is mistaken {for example, the association of the 
those who killed Yanke! Rosenbaum with the Crown Heights black community or of those 
who killed Yusef Hawkins with the Bensonhurst white community). 
107. Kelly et al., supra note 3, at 26. The Crown Heights riots exemplify how the mere 
perception of a bias crime can lead to violence between racial groups. See, e.g., Lynne Duke, 
Racial Violence Flares for 3rd Day in Brooklyn, WASH. PoST, Aug. 22, 1991, at A4 (describing 
how racial tensions from the vehicular killing of a black child led to riots in Crown Heights 
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3. The Impact of Bias Crimes on Society as a Whole 
Finally, the impact of bias crimes may spread well beyond the 
immediate victims and the target community to the general society. 
This effect includes a large array of harms from the very concrete to 
the most abstract. On the most mundane - but by no means least 
damaging - level, the isolation effects discussed above1os have a 
cumulative effect throughout a community. Consider a family, vic-
timized by an act of bias-motivated vandalism, which then begins to 
withdraw from society generally; the family members seek safety 
from an unknown assailant who, having sought them out because of 
an immutable characteristic, might well do so again. Members of 
the community, even those who are sympathetic to the plight of the 
victim family and who have been supportive of them, may be reluc-
tant to place themselves in harm's way and will shy away from so-
cializing with these victims or having their children do so. The 
isolation of this family will not be solely due to their act of with-
drawal; there is a societal act of isolation as well that injures both 
the family that is cut off and the community at large.109 
Bias crimes cause an even broader injury to the general commu-
nity. Such crimes violate not only society's general concern for the 
security of its members and their property but also the shared val-
ues of equality among its citizens and racial and religious harmony 
in a heterogeneous society. A bias crime is therefore a profound 
violation of the egalitarian ideal and the antidiscrimination princi-
ple that have become fundamental not only to the American legal 
system but to American culture as well.110 
This harm is, of course, highly contextual. We could imagine a 
society in which racial motivation for a crime w~mld implicate no 
greater value than the motivation of dislike.111 But that is not our 
society. Bias crimes implicate a social history of prejudice, discrimi-
between blacks and Jews); Crown Heights: The voices of hate must not prevail, DET. FREE 
PRESs, Aug. 25, 1991, at 2F (reporting that violence erupted between the black and Jewish 
communities after the accidental killing of a black child by a Hasidic Jew). 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99. 
109. Weiss, supra note 91, at 183. 
110. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6, at 140-41. See generally Paul Brest, The Supreme 
Court, I975 Term - Forward: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. 
REv. 1 (1976). 
111. It is not easy to imagine such a society, but it is possible. In the 1930s anthropologist 
Ethel John Lindgren reported findings about the Tungus and the Cossacks who, although 
racially and culturally distinct, lived in close proximity without conflict. See KrrANo, supra 
note 102, at 100-01. Although the Tungus were Mongolian nomads and the Cossacks were 
Caucasoid Christian village-dwellers, neither group believed itself to be racially superior. 
Although their cultural practices remained distinct, the two groups maintained supplemen-
tary and complementary relations. Id. 
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nation, and even oppression. As such, they cause a greater harm 
than parallel crimes to the immediate victim of the crime, the target 
community of the crime, and to the general society. 
II. THE ENHANCED PUNISHMENT OF BIAS CRIMES 
An analysis of any issue of criminal law, particularly of one that 
proposes the imposition of criminal punishment, must confront two 
critical requirements of just punishment: (i) only the guilty should 
be punished, and (ii) the punishment of the guilty should be propor-
tional to the crime committed.112 The balance of this article takes 
up these requirements for the punishment of bias crimes in reverse 
order. 
This Part argues that bias crimes ought to receive punishment 
that is more severe than that imposed for parallel crimes. Section 
II.A explores the proportionality requirement in depth and demon-
strates that some level of fit between the seriousness of a crime and 
the harshness of the criminal penalty is essential to modern theories 
of punishment. Section II.B turns to the means by which the harm 
and thus the seriousness of a crime may be measured. Finally, sec-
tion II.C applies the theories of proportionality and harm that have 
been developed to the context of bias crimes. This Part concludes 
that the harmful consequences particular to bias crimes warrant 
their enhanced punishment. 
A. The Proportionality Between the Seriousness of the 
Crime and the Harshness of the Criminal Punishment 
The relevance of the resulting harms caused by bias crimes to 
the punishment of those crimes springs from the requirement of 
proportionality between crime and punishment. Most punishment 
theorists accept and indeed defend this doctrine. I begin this dis-
cussion with an analysis of the traditional defense of proportionality 
associated with retributivists and then proceed to show that utilitar-
ians as well as modern eclectic punishment theories embrace the 
We may hypothesize that an assault committed by a Cossack against a Tungus out of bias 
against the Tungus race would cause no greater injury to the victim, to the Tungus community 
generally, or to the entire society than a simple assault would cause. The animus against the 
Tungus held by this individual Cossack would represent only an individual, abnormal psycho-
logical profile. It would not implicate a broad and deep fabric of racial and ethnic prejudice 
that such acts implicate in our society. 
112. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 6.3.2, at 415-16 
(1978) (criticizing social protection as a justification for punishment for its tendency to sup-
press these "two important principles of justice"). 
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proportionality requirement. I then apply these views of propor-
tionality to the context of bias crimes. 
Retribution theory justifies proportionality as inherent in the 
very nature of punishment. For the retributivist, the offender de-
serves punishment because he has violated the norms of society im-
bedded in the criminal law. The sheer fact that the defendant 
deserves to be punished - not social utility - justifies the punish-
ment.113 Retributivists do not agree on a single basis for this "de-
sert," and it is from the various answers to this inquiry that different 
strands of retributive thought emerge .. 
The simplest form of retribution theory is vengeance: the crimi-
nal has harmed society and therefore he deserves to be harmed by 
society.114 More sophisticated theories of retributive punishment 
look in two directions for a foundational concept of desert. One 
theory, following Hegel, grounds punishment in the offender's right 
to be punished. Through punishment of a crime, society demon-
strates its respect for the criminal; a criminal's fundamental right to 
be treated as an autonomous human being requires punishment for 
his choice to violate the law.115 The other strand of retributive 
thought focuses on the offender's obligation to pay the proverbial 
"debt" he owes to society as a result of his criminal activity.116 A 
civilized society requires a legal system that confers substantial ben-
efits on its citizens in return for their adherence to the rules of the 
113. Jeffrie Murphy provides the following terse and insightful definition of the retribu-
tive theory of punishment: "[S)peaking very generally, [retribution] is a theory that seeks to 
justify punishment, not in terms of social utility, but in terms of this cluster of moral concepts: 
rights, desert, merit, moral responsibility, justice, and respect for moral autonomy." JEFFRIE 
G. MURPHY, Retribution, Moral Education, and the Liberal State, in REnuaunoN REcoN-
SIDERED 15, 21 (1992). 
114. See, e.g., JosHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAw § 2.03, at 7 (1987) 
(stating that some retributivists argue that it is not only justified to punish the offender but 
"necessary to 'hurt him back' " because he has harmed society). George Fletcher has criti-
cized this view of retribution as overly simplistic in a striking phrase: "[Retribution] is obvi-
ously not to be identified with vengeance or revenge, any more than love is to be identified 
with lust." FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 6.3.2, at 417. 
115. For expositions of this theory, see G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHr 70-71 
(T.M. Knox trans., Clarendon Press 1942) (1821); Joshua Dressler, Substantive Criminal Law 
Through the Looking Glass of Rummel v. Estelle: Proportionality and Justice as Endangered 
Doctrines, 34 Sw. LJ. 1063, 1073-81 (1981); Margaret Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect 
for Persons, 53 S. CAL- L. REv. 1143, 1164-70 (1980). 
116. The classic statement of the debt metaphor as a justification for punishment is that 
of Immanuel Kant. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101-
08 (John Ladd trans., 1965) (1797). For contemporary expositions of this strand of retribu-
tive punishment theory, see FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 6.3.2, at 417-18; Herbert Morris, 
Persons and Punishment, 52 MONIST 475, 478-79 (1968), reprinted in HERBERT MORRIS, ON 
GUILT AND INNOCENCE 34-35 (1976); MURPHY, supra note 113, at 23-24; cf. John Rawls, 
Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, in LAW & PHILOSOPHY 3, 3-18 (Sidney Hook ed., 
1964). 
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system. When a member of that society breaks the law, he incurs a 
debt to society because, having enjoyed the benefits of the legal 
system, he has not accepted its burdens. The criminal's rejection of 
the burden of abiding by the law establishes a debt that he now 
owes. This debt is "paid" through punishment. 
A common ground shared by all forms of retributive thought -
simple vengeance, personhood-based,117 and debt-based retribution 
- concerns the level of appropriate punishment. Punishment, to 
be morally justifiable, must be proportional to the crime for which 
it is imposed.118 This conception of proportionality need not mean 
a mechanical application of jus talionis requiring that the punish-
ment of the offender be identical to the crime he committed.119 The 
minimum requirement for proportionality of punishment under a 
retributive theory is that the punishment for a particular crime, 
when placed along the spectrum of all criminal punishments, stands 
at the same point as that occupied by the crime in the spectrum of 
all crimes.120 This requirement is essential under both debt-based 
and personhood-based retribution. Proportional punishment satis-
fies the offender's debt under a debt-based notion of retribution 
because the offender has been required to "pay" the relative 
amount of punishment that corresponds to the relative amount of 
harm that he caused society. Under personhood-based retribution, 
proportional punishment recognizes the legitimate rights of both 
wrongdoer and offended party because it is geared to the relative 
harm done to the victim and caused by the offender. 
Proportionality of crime and punishment is not the unique prov-
ince of retributive punishment theorists. Most utilitarians also em-
117. See Radin, supra note 115, at 1164-69 (terming personhood-based retribution "pro-
tective retribution" for its foundation in protecting the integrity and autonomy of the 
individual). 
118. FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 63.2, at 416-17; KANT, supra note 116, at 131-33; J.D. 
Mabbott, Punishment, in THE PmLOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 39 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969); 
George Schedler, Retributive Punishment and the Fall of Satan, 30 AM. J. JURIS. 137, 157-59 
(1985). 
119. See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 161 (1968). Jus talionis will 
often lead to immoral results. Although reasonable people disagree as to the morality of 
executing the murderer, most if not all would regard the suggestion of raping the rapist to be 
immoral. In other instances, it is impossible to attain identity of crime and punishment. An 
adult, for example, cannot be subjected to identical punishment for child abuse. Finally, 
literal jus talionis will often be highly speculative at best. How do we know all of the damage 
suffered by a crime victim, physical and psychological, and how would we create an identical 
harm to the offender? See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 
in RETRIBUTION RECONSIDERED, supra note 113, at 31, 58-59. 
120. See, e.g., MICHAEL DA vis, How to Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, in To MAKE 
THE PUNISHMENT Frr THE CRIME 69, 77-83 (1992); MURPHY, supra note 119, at 58-60; Mab-
bott, supra note 118, at 49-50. 
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brace some concept of proportionality in their justification for 
criminal punishment. In the simplest utilitarian model, punishment 
for a category of crimes must be set at a level sufficient to deter the 
commission of those crimes.121 This concept of proportionality, 
however, is wholly extrinsic to the nature of the crime committed. 
Utilitarian punishment turns on the temptation of future criminal 
activity. The problems that such a wooden utilitarian theory 
presents are apparent. Fixing punishment at the minimum level 
necessary to deter the offender from further criminal behavior 
could lead to shockingly disproportionate penalties. Herbert 
Packer warned of a theory of punishment under which "the violent 
psychopath and the incorrigible writer of bad checks might find 
themselves side by side in lifelong detention."122 
This concern that a simplistic formula would lead to results far 
removed from widely shared intuitions about appropriate levels of 
punishment or, at least, ranges of punishment, led to efforts among 
utilitarian punishment theorists to find a means of importing a con-
cept of proportionality. Like retributivists, they sought to ground 
proportionality in the gravity of the crime, but they sought to do so 
without reliance upon retributive argument. 
Alfred Ewing, for example, argued that ideas of "proportion be-
tween guilt and penalty[ ] are too deeply rooted in our ethical 
thought to be dismissed lightly, however hard they may be to ra-
tionali[ z]e."123 He located proportionality in the educative aspect 
of criminal punishment. This educative role of punishment was an 
extension of traditional deterrence theory. The total utilitarian 
benefit achieved through punishment was not restricted to the spe-
cific deterrence of the offender himself, or even to the general de-
121. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 
AND LEGISLATION 178-188 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1879) (1823). 
122. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 140 (1968). A 
framework for punishment concerned solely with the likelihood of the offender to commit 
future crimes would look only to the minimum amount of punishment necessary to attain 
rehabilitation or specific deterrence of the offender. In certain instances, this will yield highly 
problematic results that most theorists would be unwilling to embrace. Because the goal is 
solely the deterrence of future criminal behavior, the level of punishment will be keyed only 
to the strength of the offender's disposition to commit crimes and not to the nature of the 
crimes. See also IGOR l'ruMORATZ, JUSTIFYING LEGAL PUNISHMENT 37-38 (1989). 
123. A.C. EWING, THE MORALITY OF PUNISHMENT 45 (1929). Ewing sought to justify by 
utilitarian means those notions of desert and proportionality previously associated only with 
retribution. He sought to reach these results "without the prima facie irrationality" of retrib-
utive theory. Id. at 100. Unlike other utilitarian punishment theorists of the period, such as 
Hastings Rashdall, John McTaggart, T.H. Green, and Bernard Bosanquet, Ewing saw utilita-
rianism as requiring an account of the deeply held intuitive notion of desert and of " 'justice' 
as a good-in-itself," id. at 45, and he expressly set out to provide such an account. See ALAN 
w. NORRIE, LAW, IDEOLOGY AND PUNISHMENT 121-25 (1991). 
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terrence of potential wrongdoers. Rather, the benefit included the 
general moral education of society.124 
In his explanation of the educative effect of punishment, Ewing 
sought to find a utilitarian grounding for the general concepts of 
desert and proportionality. As to desert, the moral education of 
society depends on the punishment of those who are guilty of 
wrongdoing: . 
The moral object of a punishment as such is to make people think of a 
certain kind of act as very bad, but, if it were inflicted otherwise than 
for a bad act, it would either produce no effect of this sort at all or 
cause people to think an act bad which was not really bad, and this is 
why we must first of all ask - is a punishment just?125 
Ewing's theory also grounds the requirement of proportionality be-
tween crime and punishment in the educative role of punishment. 
For Ewing, punishment must do more than provide a crude moral 
education that bifurcates all conduct into the good and the bad. 
Punishment must also teach the relative seriousness of various 
forms of impermissible conduct. The criminal law should "compare 
the degrees of badness presupposed on the average by different of-
fen[ s ]es, and, having done that, [ ] can lay down the principle that a 
lesser offen[s]e should not be punished so severely as a greater 
one."126 
Ewing's goal - to establish both desert and proportionality 
without reference to retributive argument - was not fully 
achieved. His theory remained susceptible to critique from the 
standard, and most telling, argument against pure utilitarian theo-
ries of punishment. Theoretically, moral education could be 
achieved through the punishment of the wholly innocent. As long 
as the authorities concealed the fact of a defendant's innocence, the 
punishment of the innocent person might have a strong educative 
effect.127 The utilitarian rejoinder to this critique is that the educa-
tive effect of punishment is, by definition, served only by the pun-
ishment of the guilty; punishment of the innocent fails to impart the 
proper moral education.128 The flaw in this rejoinder is that it con-
fuses punishment and publicity. Punishment itself neither deters 
nor educates beyond the defendant himself. As Mabbott wrote, "A 
124. See PRIMORATZ, supra note 122, at 115-17. 
125. EWING, supra note 123, at 104. 
126. Id. at 106. 
127. See NoRRIE, supra note 123, at 123-25; Mabbott, supra note 118, at 152-54. 
128. This is the response mounted by Ewing himself. See EwJNG, supra note 123, at 91. 
For a contemporary statement of this argument, see Jean Hampton, The Moral Education 
Theory of Punishment, 13 PHIL. & PuB. A.FF. 208, 228-29 (1984). 
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judge sentences a man to three years' imprisonment not to three 
years plus three columns in the press."129 General moral education, 
like general deterrence, turns on publication of the punishment. So 
long as the publication excl1:1des reference to the innocence of the 
defendant, it will achieve Ewing's educative purpose. 
Ewing's theories, however, set the stage for much of the debate 
over the justification for punishment.130 What Ewing sought to do 
solely within a utilitarian framework has been better accomplished 
by those developing "mixed theories" of punishment, drawing on 
aspects of both utilitarian and retributivist thought. These eclectic 
approaches embrace proportionality of punishment and guilt, not as 
a theory that serves to justify punishment in its own right, but 
rather as a limiting principle of a justification for the imposition of 
criminal punishment. Two prominent illustrative examples will 
suffice. 
Hart's distinction between the "General Justifying Aim" for 
punishment and the limiting principles governing the "Distribu-
tion" of punishment allows a significant role for proportionality.131 
Lengthy sentences for minor crimes might be effective to deter the 
commission of such crimes, but, for Hart, it is "wrong to employ 
them."132 Such sentences are wrong neither because of the retribu-
tive reason that there is a "penalty 'naturally' fitted to [the crime's] 
degree· of iniquity"133 nor because of the traditional utilitarian rea-
son that the imposition of such a sentence would impose a greater 
cost on the offender than benefit to the society.134 Rather, "[t]he 
guiding principle is that of a proportion within a system of penalties 
between those imposed for different offenses where these have a 
distinct place in a commonsense scale of gravity."135 This "com-
monsense scale" is a central aspect of Hart's synthesis of utilitarian 
and retributive theories. Hart relies on "very broad judgments both 
of relative moral iniquity and harmfulness of different types of of-
fense."136 Without the conformity of punishment to such a scale, 
common morality may be confused or the law may be held in 
contempt.137 
129. Mabbott, supra note 118, at 40. 
130. See, e.g., NORRIE, supra note 123, at 121-25. 
131. See HART, supra note 119, at 8-24. 
132. Id. at 24-25. 
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Packer also embraces a critical role for proportionality between 
crime and punishment. Packer's "integrated theory of punishment" 
places proportionality as one of the issues of the minimal doctrinal 
content of criminal law.138 Packer writes, "It is inescapable ... that 
some offenses are to be taken more seriously than others and that 
the severity of the available punishment should be proportioned to 
the seriousness with which the offense is viewed."139 
Proportionality is a key element of the justifications for punish-
ment. Whether through the retributive argument in its Kantian and 
Hegelian roots and modem interpretations, through the position 
advanced by such utilitarian theorists as Ewing, or through the con-
temporary eclectic theorists, it is, as Packer said, "inescapable" that 
some crimes are worse than others and must be punished more se-
verely as a result. Before this understanding of proportionality may 
be brought to bear on the ultimate question of the present project 
- the punishment of bias crimes - the question of what it means 
for one crime to be "worse" than another deserves further 
attention. 
B. Evaluating the Seriousness of Crimes: Considering 
Culpability and Measuring Harms 
Two elements of a crime describe its seriousness: the culpability 
of the offender140 and the harm caused to society.141 Murder, for 
example, is a more serious crime than intentional assault because of 
the harm caused. Although the offender acts willfully in both in-
stances, the murder victim is dead, whereas the assault victim is 
only injured. Murder is also a more serious crime than an acciden-
tal killing because of the difference in the actors' culpability. 
Although a death results in each case, the murderer acts willfully, 
whereas the accidental killer acts without intent. 
Much has been said about the role of culpability in the assess-
ment of the seriousness of a crime. Most of the study and articula-
138. PACKER, supra note 122, at 62-70, 139-45. 
139. Id. at 143. Why an offense might be taken more seriously can be a matter of a 
retributive assessment of wrongdoing or a utilitarian measure of potential social damage. For 
Packer, "[t]he point is that different offenses are perceived differentially regardless of why 
they are perceived differently." Id. at 144. 
140. I follow the Model Penal Code in using culpability as a descriptive term meaning 
state of mind. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2) {1962) {defining the culpability categories 
of "purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently"). I use the term mens rea, on 
the other hand, as a normative term, arising out of assessment of blame or wrongdoing. See 
FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 6.2.1, at 398-401 (discussing normative and descriptive usages of 
mens rea). 
141. See, e.g., ANDREW voN HmsCH, PAST OR FuruRE CRIMES 64-67 {1985). 
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tion of modem criminal law has been toward a focus on the state of 
mind or culpability of the accused. This focus does not mean that 
the results of the conduct are unimportant. Rather, punishment 
under the criminal law, whether based on a retributive or conse-
quentialist argument, is critically linked to the actor's mental 
state.142 
Culpability and its impact on the seriousness of a particular 
crime emerge directly from substantive criminal law.143 In extreme 
terms, culpability is necessary at some level for guilt at all. The 
utter absence of culpability negates the possibility of guilt.144 We 
can also draw much finer distinctions about culpability from ex-
isting criminal law doctrine. Culpability provides the general or-
ganizing mechanism within which the Model Penal Code assigns 
levels of punishment. For most crimes under the Code, purposeful 
142. The focus on culpability is consistent with punishment that is grounded either in the 
retributive goal of meting out just deserts or in the utilitarian goal of reducing criminal con-
duct. See HART, supra note 119, at 26-27 (recognizing that specific and general deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation all serve the goal of reducing criminal conduct). 
Nowhere is the centrality of the accused's mental state to crime reduction theory more 
clearly visible than in the influential Model Penal Code. The Code's organizing principle is 
culpability, and the grading of offenses is based upon the defendant's culpability as to each 
element of the crime. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CoDE § 210 (1962) (prescribing that grades of 
criminal homicide are determined by the culpability of the accused). Moreover, except in the 
case of capital crimes or first-degree felonies, the Code prescribes the same punishment for 
the crimes of attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy as for the crime attempted or solicited or 
that is the object of the conspiracy. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 5.05(1) (1962). Thus, the Code is 
a marked departure from the common law, under which inchoate crimes are punished less 
severely than the target offense. See DRESSLER, supra note 114, §§ 27.02, 27.09, at 331, 363; 
see also Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Attempts and the Role of Resulting Harm Under the 
Code, and in the Common Law, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 725 (1988). See generally HART, supra note 
119, at 1-27; PACKER, supra note 122, at 100-02. 
Retribution theory also centers on the culpability of the individual. This is most readily 
apparent in the form of retributive theory that justifies punishment based on the incorrect 
moral choice made by the individual to do wrong. See KANT, supra note 116, at 100. Culpa-
bility is of equal import to those retributivists who are primarily concerned with conse-
quences. Herbert Morris, for example, has argued that the accused's duty to suffer 
punishment flows both from his moral choice and the consequences of his conduct. See MoR-
rus, supra note 116, at 34-36; see also FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 6.6.5, at 472-83 (discussing 
the relationship between wrongdoing and the consequent harm). That results are relevant to 
some retributivists does not negate the critical role of individual choice that underpins any 
deontological theory of punishment. Choice can be understood only in the context of 
culpability. 
143. My colleague Ken Simons has provided a thorough restatement and critique of the 
treatment of culpability in the substantive criminal law and its role in establishing the serious-
ness of various crimes. See Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REv. 
463 (1992). 
144. This is to be distinguished from strict liability crimes, which do not require culpabil-
ity. A defendant is not guilty of a strict liability crime. Rather, the defendant has violated 
the strictures of such a crime. Similarly, there is not "punishment" for strict liability crimes in 
the same sense that there is punishment for other crimes, and that is precisely because of the 
absence of criminal culpability. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CoDE §§ 1.04(5), 2.05 (1962) (pro-
viding that strict liability is sufficient for conviction of only "violations" that do not carry 
criminal punishment per se). 
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or knowing conduct warrants a more severe penalty than does reck-
less conduct; recklessness itself gives rise to harsher punishment 
than that corresponding to negligent criminal behavior.145 More-
over, the doctrines relating to excuse generally, and to provocation 
or diminished capacity in particular, are premised upon the rela-
tionship between the offender's culpability and the seriousness of 
his crime.146 
In contrast to this doctrinally and theoretically well-developed 
understanding of the relationship between culpability and the level 
of punishment, the role of harm in assessing this relationship has 
been largely unexplored. This gap is surprising because the intui-
tive case for harm as a key component in assessing a crime's seri-
ousness is at least as strong as it is for culpability. 
The intuitive claim is most evident in the relative treatment of 
homicide and attempted homicide. Society punishes a successful 
murderer with greater severity than an unsuccessful, would-be mur-
derer, even if the latter fails to kill his victim for reasons wholly 
extrinsic to his own efforts - for example, the unforeseeable 
weapon malfunction. From a culpability standpoint, the successful 
and would-be murderers are the same, yet their punishments dif-
fer.147 The same point may be illustrated at the lower end of the 
homicide scale. Reckless conduct - that is, reckless risk creation 
- resulting in death constitutes the felony of manslaughter.148 If 
the identical conduct with the identical culpability does not result in 
death, however, the actor is guilty of a far lesser crime, often only 
145. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2) {1962) {defining the culpability categories of 
"purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "negligently"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1-.4 
{1962) (prescribing grades of criminal homicide determined by the culpability of the 
accused). 
146. See FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 6.6.2, at 461-63 (noting that excuse doctrines are 
premised upon the understanding that "[l]esser culpability justifies a mitigated punishment"); 
Martin Wasik, Excuses at the Sentencing Stage, 1983 CruM. L. REv. 450. 
147. See generally FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 4.1, at 240-42 (noting that courts could 
theoretically refrain from using harm as a factor bearing on the gravity of the offense). As 
mentioned above, see supra note 142, the Model Penal Code ordinarily treats attempts the 
same as completed crimes for purposes of punishment. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) 
(1962) (prescribing the same punishment for the crimes of attempt, solicitation, and conspir-
acy as for the crime attempted or solicited or that is the object of the conspiracy); see also 
Ashworth, supra note 142, at 738 {discussing whether the Model Penal Code is correct in 
treating attempts as equivalent in grade to the offense attempted). The only exception to this 
general rule is for first-degree felonies: the attempt or solicitation or conspiracy to commit a 
first-degree felony is reduced to a second-degree felony. See MoDEL PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) 
{1962). 
148. The Model Penal Code defines criminal homicide as purposely, knowingly, reck-
lessly or negligently causing the death of another. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) 
(1962). Criminal homicide that is committed recklessly constitutes manslaughter. MODEL 
PENAL CoDE § 210.3(1)(a) (1962). 
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a misdemeanor such as the Model Penal Code's "reckless 
endangerment."149 
Homicide doctrine alone, however, is of limited value in illumi-
nating the role of harm in punishment law. In many ways, homicide 
is a unique crime.150 All that we can learn from homicide doctrine 
in this context is that at the extreme end of all crimes - the taking 
of a human life - it matters greatly whether or not someone actu-
ally dies. For a theory of harm useful across a broader range of 
crimes, one must reason from first principles. 
1\vo initial propositions inform the evaluation of relative harms. 
First, the kind of harms that we wish to measure cannot be re-
stricted to the individualized reactions of particular victims. Be-
cause the purpose of gauging harms here is to inform the criminal 
law, the weighing process must entail a large aspect of aggregation. 
Second, the relative harms caused by various crimes need not be 
universal and will often be contextual to a particular society. 
Although most societies will consider murder worse than assault, 
the relative harms caused by trespass, theft, and simple assault may 
vary with a culture's valuation of private property and physical 
integrity. 
The calculus of harms may proceed from either an ex ante or ex 
post point of view. The ex ante analysis ranks the harms that result 
from various crimes in terms of the relative risk preferences of a 
rational person.151 The least harmful crime of all is the one that the 
rational person would risk, given a choice between risking this 
crime and any other crime. The same process of analysis may then 
149. See MooEL PENAL CooE § 211.2 (1962) (providing that recklessly causing a risk of 
death to another is a misdemeanor). Several states have adopted this approach to the pun-
ishment of reckless endangerment. Compare, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 11.41.250(b} (1989} 
(making reckless endangerment a class A misdemeanor) with ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.120 
(1993) (making manslaughter a class A felony); ARlzoNA REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1201 (1989} 
(making reckless endangerment class 1 misdemeanor or, if there was a substantial risk of 
imminent death, a class 6 felony) with ARIZONA REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1103 (West Supp. 
1993} (making manslaughter a class 2 felony); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-63 (West 1985) 
(making reckless endangerment class A misdemeanor) with CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-55 
(1993} (making first-degree manslaughter a class B felony). 
Some states grade reckless endangerment as a felony, but in no jurisdiction is it graded as 
seriously as manslaughter. Compare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.25(McKinney1987) (mak-
ing first-degree reckless endangerment a class D felony) with N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.20 (Mc-
Kinney 1994) (making first-degree manslaughter a class B felony); Wis. STAT.§ 941.30 (1991-
92} (making first-degree reckless endangerment a class D felony) with Wis. STAT. § 940.06 
(1991-92) (making reckless homicide a class C felony). 
150. For a full analysis of the innumerable unique issues in the criminal law raised by the 
crime of homicide, see FLETCHER, supra note 112, §§ 4.1-5.3, at 235-390. 
151. Mabbott proposes an analogous approach to evaluating the relative harms caused by 
various crimes. See Mabbott, supra note 118, at 162. For a more recent exposition of the ex 
ante evaluation of relative harms, see DAVIS, supra note 120, at 80-81. 
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be brought to bear on all remaining crimes to produce the next-to-
least harmful crime.152 Once every crime has been considered, a 
rough ranking will exist of crimes from the least to the most 
harmful. 
This process produces only a rough ranking because there are 
several necessary qualifications. The first qualification stems from 
the first general proposition discussed above.153 The aggregation of 
harm assessments of all rational actors in a society renders it impos-
sible to create a strict ranking of all harms in a numerical order. 
The first qualification, therefore, is that the ranking of crimes by 
harm caused produces not a strict numerical ranking but a series of 
groupings of crimes, and these groupings may be small in number. 
This small number of groupings is not, however, problematic for 
our project. The purpose of assessing relative harms is to give con-
tent to the goal of assigning punishment based on the seriousness of 
the crime. A small number of "harm levels" correlates with the 
similarly small number of discrete crime levels that most jurisdic-
tions maintain.154 
The second qualification to the ex ante ranking of crimes by 
harm stems from the difficulty in comparing unlike harms. It is one 
thing to say with some confidence that the rational person would 
risk suffering a petit larceny before risking grand larceny and there-
fore the harm of the former is less than the harm of the latter. It is 
quite another to ascertain the rational person's choice between the 
theft of a substantial sum of money and a fraud causing an approxi-
mately equivalent loss. This qualification also finds its solution in 
the small number of harm groupings. For example, in ranking 
fraud, theft, assault, and petty theft, a rational person would proba-
bly think the following: 
(i) The fraud and the theft represent roughly the same risk level 
and therefore ought to be grouped together for purposes of assessing 
the harm resulting from these crimes; 
152. Professor Davis describes this analysis with the following formula: 
The least crime is the one a rational person would prefer to risk (all else equal) given a 
choice between risking it and risking any other of that type; the next least is the one a 
rational person would prefer to risk given a choice between it and any other of that type 
except the least; and so on. 
DAVIS, supra note 120, at 80. 
153. Although each crime causes a unique harm to its victim, our purpose is not to mea-
sure these individual subjective assessments of harm but rather to probe for an aggregated, 
societal assessment of the harm associated with the commission of a crime. See text accom-
panying notes 150-51. 
154. The Model Penal Code, for example, provides for only six levels of crimes: felonies 
of the first, second, and third degree, misdemeanors, petty misdemeanors, and violations. See 
MooEL PENAL CooE §§ 1.04, 6.01 (1962). 
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(ii) I would risk either fraud or theft of a substantial sum of money 
before risking assault with a deadly weapon; 
(iii) I would risk neither fraud nor theft of a substantial sum of 
money before risking a petty theft. 
Relative harms may also be assessed through an ex post analysis 
that focuses on the nature of the resulting harm. This analysis seeks 
to rank crimes according to what the victim has lost as a result of 
the crime. Professors von Hirsch and Jareborg have proposed mea-
suring harm in this manner through reference to a "living standard 
analysis. "155 
To understand the concept of living standard analysis, it is ini-
tially helpful to understand what the "living standard" is not. First, 
it is not limited to issues of relative economic affluence, as in the 
traditional meaning of standard of living in economic literature.156 
Von Hirsch and Jareborg adopt a broader meaning, developed by 
Amartya Sen, that encompasses not only economic abilities but 
economic and noneconomic factors, all of which bear on a total 
sense of a person's well-being.157 Second, the living standard is not 
limited to those issues that affect an individual's ability to make 
choices about his life.158 A broad conception of living standard cap-
tures the nature of certain harms - for example, serious bodily 
injury - through which the victim loses more than the ability to 
make life choices. 
Harm, as measured by loss or negative impact upon living stan-
dard, becomes a far-reaching concept that draws upon our assess-
ment of what it means to live a good life - a key question raised 
both in everyday life and complex social inquiry.159 This measuring 
device allows for a meaningful comparison of harms based on the 
interests implicated by a particular crime. Reckless driving and ag-
gravated assault might produce the same physical injury to a victim, 
155. Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard 
Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1991). 
156. See, e.g., WILLARD W. CoCHRANE & CAROLYN SHAW BELL, THE EcoNoMics OF 
CoNSUMPTION 17 (1956) (defining standard of living as the list of goods, services, and condi-
tions the individual strives to attain); CARLE C. ZIMMERMAN, CoNSUMPTION AND STAN-
DARDS OF LIVING 3 (1936) (arguing that standard of living consists in part of the goods and 
services that society wants to consume and acquire). 
157. Amartya Sen, The Standard of Living: Lecture II, Lives and Capabilities, in THE 
STANDARD OF LIVING 20 (Geoffrey Hawthorn ed., 1987). 
158. Joel Feinberg has proposed measuring the resulting harm from a crime by the impact 
of the crime on the ability of the victim to make choices as to the manner by which he will 
conduct his life. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 37-61, 188-217 (1984) (measuring 
harm by the impact of a crime on a victim's "welfare interests"). 
159. See Amartya Sen, The Standard of Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques, in THE 
STANDARD OF LIVING, supra note 157, at 1; von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 155, at 13-14. 
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but the assault will likely offend the victim psychologically, whereas 
the car accident will not. The aggravated assault is thus the more 
serious crime of the two.160 A satisfactory measurement of harms 
for the purpose of understanding the relative seriousness of crimes 
must have a means by which to capture the distinction between 
these two crimes. 
The living· standard measure of harm is necessarily contextual. 
Properly understood, this contextuality is a virtue and not a short-
coming. Sensitivity to cultural variation is an essential element of 
any attempt to measure harm.161 Living standard analysis is contin-
gent upon the values a society holds.162 Although intercultural 
comparisons of harm may therefore be difficult to achieve, relative 
judgments within a culture as to harm will be possible. 
The living standard analysis admittedly is vague: What does it 
mean to compare various injuries that could be caused to the re-
spective victims' sense of well-being? But although the analysis 
cannot produce a precise formula for measuring harm, neither is it a 
mere foil for unguided discretion and unprincipled intuition.163 
Living standard analysis provides both a consistent vocabulary for 
the discussion of harm and a set of principled limitations on that 
discussion. It thus enables discussion of questions essential to un-
derstanding whether the enhanced punishment of bias crimes may 
be justified.164 
160. See von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 155, at 14, 20. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 150-51. 
162. Von Hirsch and Jareborg cite the "extreme example" of the harm caused by rape in 
Bangladesh as opposed to western countries. See von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 155, at 
14. Surely rape causes an excruciating level of harm in our society. The harm that results 
from a rape in Bangladesh, however, transcends even this level, because in addition to the 
physical assault and personal trauma caused by rape, there is the additional harm to the rape 
victim of total social ostracism. Id. 
163. I do not address the more far-reaching potential criticism of the living standard anal-
ysis - that it does not provide a precise formula for assessing harm and thus assigning levels 
of criminal punishment. This criticism misses the mark because it is based on a faulty prem-
ise. For several reasons, no such precise formula is possible. First, those who actually employ 
this analysis or any analysis in the creation of a listing of comparative harms will necessarily 
have to use their judgment in doing so. Second, no workable theory can produce more than a 
reasonably small number of discrete harm categories. Final assignment of crimes within 
these categories will also require judgment on the part both of criminal law drafters and 
sentencing judges. The purpose of the living standard analysis is not to determine harm 
levels perfectly and exactly but to provide a vocabulary and a theoretical framework in which 
the determination might take place. 
164. Living standard analysis seeks to take account of those harms that are inherently 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. My contention is that with all the difficulties in 
describing such injuries as those to dignity and autonomy, no analysis of harms is complete or 
even minimally useful without factoring in these types of injury. As Geoffrey Hawthorn 
wrote about Sen's conception of the living standard, "we have to reject being precisely wrong 
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Measuring harms with the living standard analysis requires a fo-
cus on two key variables. The first variable is the severity of a par-
ticular crime's invasion upon a victim's "personal interest." 
Consider the personal interest represented by the traditional eco-
nomic term standard of living. At one end of the spectrum are inju-
ries to the most primal and basic issues of standard of living -
survival with the barest of human functional capacity. Crimes that 
cause injury on this level are the most serious of all. At the other 
end of the spectrum is deprivation of a relatively high level of com-
fort; this injury, although real, is not great. Between these end 
points, there is a potentially infinite number of gradations of well-
being. In order to provide a scale that will be consistent in applica-
tion and suggest no greater accuracy than it may fairly claim, a rela-
tively small number of interim points is appropriate.16s 
The second variable for living standard analysis is the various 
kinds of interests that may be violated by a crime. These interests 
begin, but do not end, with physical safety and the protection of 
material possessions. At a minimum, a full understanding of living 
standard must also include a recognition of personal dignity inter-
ests and those of individual autonomy.166 
We may then discuss the harm caused by various crimes in terms 
of how deep an injury is sustained and to what kind of interests. 
Murder affects physical safety at the most profound level and is 
thus a crime of the gravest harm evaluation. Burglary may have a 
minimal effect on physical safety, particularly if it occurs at a time 
when the dwelling would likely be unoccupied. Burglary will, how-
ever, have some greater impact on living standard with respect to 
material possessions. This might interfere only with a level of rela-
tive comfort - the taking of a VCR - or with the level of primal 
basic needs - the taking of a car from a house in the desert with no 
other means of transportation and no means of communication. 
But neither of these interests captures the full harm caused by a 
burglary. The deepest harm caused by a burglary may well stem 
in favor of being vaguely right." See Geoffrey Hawthorn, Introduction to THE STANDARD OF 
LIVING, supra note 157, at vii-viii. 
165. Von Hirsch and Jareborg propose a living standard scale of four levels, including the 
end points of (i) subsistence, (ii) minimal well-being, (iii) adequate well-being, and (iv) en-
hanced well-being. See von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 155, at 17-19. 
166. See Sen, supra note 157, at 26-29. In their discussion of living standard analysis, von 
Hirsch and Jareborg suggest four such interests, although they acknowledge that their compi-
lation was less the result of supporting theory than "impressions" of the kinds of interests 
normally involved in crimes committed. They propose physical integrity, material support 
and amenity, freedom from humiliation, and privacy and autonomy. See von Hirsch & 
Jareborg, supra note 155, at 19-21. 
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from the violation of the victim's sense of autonomy. Victims of 
burglaries often describe the ongoing injury they feel as they con-
tinue to live in the house that the perpetrator unlawfully entered.167 
The final stage of living standard analysis calls for a combination 
of the injuries to various interests caused by a crime. The injuries 
to different interests caused by a single crime may vary in severity. 
In the case of burglary, for example, the injury to physical safety 
might be minimal, the injury to material possession variable, and 
the injury to autonomy significant. In order to determine the rela-
tive harm caused by the crime of burglary, we must aggregate these 
various injuries in some manner. 
We might assess the relative harm caused by crimes by begin-
ning with the deepest injury inflicted upon any interest by a crime 
and setting harm, at minimum, at this level. If we decide that bur-
glary causes a very serious - but not the most profound - injury 
to autonomy interests, we would set its harm level at a similar "very 
serious" level. This level will be one of a small number of discrete 
levels of harm.168 But what of the other interests affected by bur-
glary? Depending upon the severity of the intrusion, these interests 
may be used to increase the measure of harm caused by burglary 
within the "very serious" harm level.169 Living standard analysis 
permits not only an assignment of crimes to a small number of harm 
levels but also a rough set of rankings within these broad ranges. 
Both the ex ante analysis of ranking harms in terms of the rela-
tive risk preferences of a rational person and the ex post ranking of 
harms through use of a living standard analysis help clarify the 
harms caused by crimes. Harm, along with culpability, lies at the 
heart of measuring the seriousness of a crime. Armed with the 
above discussion, I now return to the context of racially motivated 
violence and the question of the relative seriousness of bias crimes 
and parallel crimes. 
C. The Relative Seriousness of Bias Crimes 
The seriousness of a crime, as discussed above,110 is a function 
of the offender's culpability and the harm caused. It follows, there-
fore, that the relative seriousness of bias crimes and parallel crimes 
will also tum on the culpability and harm associated with each. 
167. ELIAS, supra note 105, at 116. 
168. See, e.g., supra note 154 (describing the six levels of crimes under the Model Penal 
Code). 
169. See von Hirsch & Jareborg, supra note 155, at 23-35. 
170. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42. 
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In order to compare the culpability attached to parallel crimes 
and bias crimes, we must first return to the central relationship be-
tween the two. Every bias crime contains within it a "parallel" 
crime against person or property. In the case of a bias-motivated 
assault, for example, the parallel crime of assault exists alongside 
the bias crime. In a sense, the parallel crime exists "within" the 
civil rights crime. Thus, bias crimes are two-tiered crimes, com-
prised of a parallel crime with the addition of bias motivation.171 
The comparison of culpability for parallel crimes and bias crimes 
will thus weigh the single-tier mens rea of the parallel crime with 
the two-tier mens rea of the bias crime. The requisite mens rea for 
the parallel crime will generally be recklessness, knowledge, or pur-
pose.172 This mens rea represents the requisite culpability for both 
the parallel crime and the first tier of the bias crime. Whatever 
culpability distinction does exist between parallel crimes and bias 
crimes resides at the second-tier mens rea of the bias crime. To 
establish a bias crime, the prosecution must prove, along with the 
171. I have argued at length elsewhere that the most compelling basis for the distinction 
between parallel crimes and civil rights crimes generally, including bias crimes, is the mental 
state of the actor. See Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2200-07, 
2209-10. This argument is further developed below in order to demonstrate that the guilt of 
the bias crime offender turns on his possessing a bias motivation. See infra Part ill. 
172. The parallel crimes of most bias crimes are crimes against the person or property, 
such as vandalism or assault. To be guilty of these parallel crimes, the accused must have 
possessed a specific intent with respect to the elements of the crime. The Model Penal Code 
has broadened the traditional concept of specific intent to include not only purposefulness 
but also knowledge. Under the Code: 
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the 
element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware 
that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii} if the element 
involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct 
will cause such result. 
MODEL PENAL CooE § 2.02(2}(b) (1962). 
For some parallel crimes, however, the requisite culpability is less than specific intent, in 
which recklessness will suffice for criminal liability. The Model Penal Code defines reckless-
ness as follows: 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he con-
sciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or 
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, consider-
ing the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, 
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding 
person would observe in the actor's situation. 
MODEL PENAL CooE § 2.02(c) (1962). 
Consider, for example, an offender who throws rocks at a place of worship. Although he 
may be specifically motivated by the religious affiliation of the institution, his purpose is not 
to cause any actual property damage. Thus, his culpability with respect to bias is certainly 
purposefulness, but his culpability with respect to the parallel crime of vandalism is only 
recklessness. In several states he would be guilty of the bias crime of religiously motivated 
vandalism. See, e.g., Mo. CooE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 470A (Supp. 1993}; Mo. REv. STAT. 
§ 574.085 (Supp. 1993); Omo REv. CooE ANN. § 2909.11(4) (Baldwin 1988); see also Law-
rence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2205-06 (defending a two-tiered 
mens rea approach in defining bias crimes). 
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first-tier mens rea applicable to the parallel crime, that the accused 
was motivated by bias in the commission of the parallel crime.173 
This proof would be necessary under either the racial animus model 
or the discriminatory selection model of bias crimes. Under the ra-
cial animus model, the offender must have purposefully acted in 
furtherance of his hostility toward the target group. Under the dis-
criminatory selection model, the offender must have purposefully 
selected the victim on the basis of his perceived membership in the 
target group. Under either model, nothing short of this mens rea of 
purpose will constitute the requisite culpability for the second tier 
of a bias crime. Unless the perpetrator was motivated to cause 
harm to another because of the victim's race, the crime is clearly 
not a bias crime.174 
The culpability associated with the commission of parallel 
crimes and bias crimes is thus identical as to what the offender did 
and differs only in· respect to why the offender did so. The rele-
vance of this difference in culpability to the calculation of crime 
seriousness depends upon the reasons that the culpability itself is 
relevant to crime seriousness. 
Why is it that the intentional murderer ought to be punished 
more severely than the negligent killer? The result of the conduct 
of each is the death of the victim; they differ only as to their culpa-
bility.175 To the consequentialist, the murderer is punished more 
because he was more likely to cause death than was the negligent 
killer.176 If this is the role of culpability in the calculation of crime 
seriousness, then the culpability associated with bias crimes makes 
these crimes more severe than parallel crimes. Bias crime offenders 
173. Under both federal and state law, the burden on the prosecution is to show motiva-
tion. See Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2209; Hernandez, 
supra note 10, at 848-50; Morsch, supra note 10, at 664-67. 
The second-tier mens rea for bias crimes of motivation is akin to the Model Penal Code 
culpability level of "purpose." See Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 
4, at 2209-10. Motive can be distinguished from purpose. Purpose concerns a person's con· 
scious object to engage in certain conduct or to cause a certain result. See, e.g., MoDEL 
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1962). Motive, on the other hand, concerns the cause that 
drives the action to further that purpose. See Morsch, supra note 10, at 666. Although pur-
pose and motive are plainly not identical, the distinction is not critical in the framework of a 
two-tier analysis. Consider the bias crime of an assault with racial motivation. The perpetra· 
tor of this crime could either (i) possess a mens rea of purposefulness or knowledge or reck· 
lessness with respect to the assault along with a motivation of racial bias; or (ii) possess a 
first-tier mens rea of purposefulness (or knowledge or recklessness) with respect to the paral-
lel crime of assault and a second-tier mens rea of purpose with respect to the object to assault 
the victim because of his race. See Lawrence, Hate Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox, supra note 
4, at 719-20. 
174. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2209-10. 
175. See supra text accompanying notes 140-42. 
176. For an exposition of this view, see Simons, supra note 143, at 503-08. 
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are more likely to cause harm than are those who commit the same 
crimes without bias motivation. Bias crimes generally are more 
likely to be assaults than are parallel crimes and bias-motivated as-
saults are far more likely to be brutal.177 
An alternative explanation for punishing the murderer more se-
verely than the negligent killer is that his act of killing intentionally 
is more blameworthy than is the accidental, or even reckless, kill-
ing.178 If culpability is relevant to crime seriousness because it 
bears on blameworthiness, then the argument that the culpability 
associated with bias crimes makes these crimes more serious than 
parallel crimes is as compelling as it was for the consequentialist. 
The motivation of the bias crime offender violates the equality prin-
ciple, one of the most deeply held tenets in our legal system and our 
culture.179 To the extent that crime seriousness is designed to cap-
ture a deontological concept of blameworthiness, bias crimes are 
more serious than other crimes. The rhetoric surrounding the en-
actment of bias crime laws suggests that most supporters of such 
legislation espouse a thoroughly deontological justification for the 
enhanced punishment of racially motivated violence.180 
This trend is well illustrated by an unusual punishment for bias 
crimes proposed in Marlborough, Massachusetts. The Marlborough 
city council unanimously approved an ordinance that would deny 
public services, such as local licenses, library cards, ·or even trash 
removal, to those convicted of bias crimes. Supporters of the ordi-
nance drew upon the community's disdain for the racial prejudice 
demonstrated by the bias criminal rather than the harm caused by 
the criminal's conduct.181 
Culpability analysis, therefore, advances the argument for the 
relatively greater seriousness of bias crimes. The argument is 
equally supported by culpability theory based upon consequential-
ist and nonconsequentialist justifications for punishment. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87. 
178. See Simons, supra note 143, at 495-96. 
179. See supra text accompanying note 110. 
180. See, e.g., 139 CoNG. REc. S13176 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1993) (statement of Sen. Fein-
stein, chief sponsor of the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act of 1993) (arguing for 
the Act's passage because "[s]omeone who selects a victim of a crime based on bigotry and 
hatred, should be subject to the stiffest penalties"). 
181. See Doreen Iudica Vigue, Marlborough Eyes Halt to Services as Hate Crime Penalty, 
BoSToN GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1994, at 1. The proposed ordinance was later vetoed by the city's 
mayor who raised concerns both as to the ordinance's enforceability and its constitutionality. 
See Doreen Iudica Vigue, Marlborough Mayor Vetoes Hate Crime Law, BoSToN GLOBE, Feb. 
3, 1994, at 22. 
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A harms-based analysis also demonstrates that bias crimes are 
more serious than parallel crimes, regardless of the theory of pun-
ishment we assume.182 Under an ex ante analysis, the question is 
whether the rational person would risk a parallel crime before he 
would risk a bias crime.183 For several reasons, the answer is proba-
bly yes. Consider the example of vandalism. The parallel crime 
arising out of the defacement of a building or home is primarily a 
nuisance to the victim. The loss is insurable and, if not insured, is 
suffered in terms of time or money or both. If that vandalism is 
bias-motivated, the defacement might take the form of swastikas on 
a synagogue or racist graffiti on the home of an African-American 
family. This harm is not a mere nuisance. The potential for deep 
psychological harm, and the feelings of threat discussed earlier,184 
exceed the harm ordinarily experienced by vandalism victims. No 
one can buy insurance to cover these additional harms. Faced with 
the choice between these two types of vandalism, the rational per-
son would risk the relatively insurable parallel crime before risking 
the more personally threatening bias crime with its longer-lasting 
effects.185 
A similar analysis applies to attacks against persons rather than 
property. In the parallel crime of assault, the perpetrator generally 
selects the victim (i) randomly or for no particular conscious rea-
son, (ii) for a reason that has nothing to do with the victim's per-
sonal identity, such as when the victim is apparently carrying 
money, or (iii) for a reason relating to personal animosity between 
the perpetrator and the victim. A random assault or a mugging 
182. The analysis of proportionality above, see supra text accompanying notes 113-39, 
drew upon retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. Under each, the severity of 
punishment must correlate in some manner with the seriousness of the offense. The harms 
analysis that follows in the text draws on the proportionality argument developed in this 
article and therefore applies to both retributive and utilitarian justifications of punishment. 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54. 
184. See supra text accompanying notes 91-107. 
185. A recent case of an electrical fire that destroyed a Boston area synagogue provides 
the framework for a useful hypothetical example of a rational person's relative willingness to 
bear the risk of parallel vandalism versus bias-motivated vandalism. See Matthew Brelis, 
Synagogue Fire is Traced to Faulty Circuit Breaker, BoSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1994, at 38. In 
the short period immediately after the fire, prior to the determination of the cause, there 
might well have been widespread concern that the fire was the result of bias-motivated arson. 
In this case, the news that it was not would be met with great relief. Part of this relief would 
be attributed to the fact that the fire had occurred accidentally and was not the result of 
arson, bias-motivated or otherwise. But this explanation would not capture the entire reac-
tion, part of which would be attributable to the fact that anti-Semitism was ruled out as a 
cause. Had the fire been caused by foul play without bias motivation - for example, by 
pecuniarily motivated arson without any trace of anti-Semitism - surely the reaction of both 
victims and the general community would have exceeded the reaction that followed the acci-
dental fire, but it would not have been as great as if the arson had been religiously motivated. 
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leaves a victim with at least a sense of being unfortunate and at 
most a sense of heightened vulnerability. An assault as a result of 
personal animosity causes at most a focused fear or anger directed 
at the perpetrator.186 Unlike a parallel assault, a bias-motivated as-
s~ult is neither random nor directed at the victim as an individual, 
and this selection and the message it carries cause all the harms 
discussed earlier.187 The perpetrator selects the victim because of 
some immutable characteristic, actual or perceived. As unpleasant 
as a parallel assault is, the rational person would still risk being vic-
timized in that manner before he would risk the unique humiliation 
of a bias-motivated assault. 
An ex post analysis provides further clarity and support for this 
conclusion. A living standard analysis focuses on depth of injury 
caused by a crime to interests like physical safety, material posses- · 
sions, personal dignity, and autonomy.188 The parallel assault crime 
and the bias assault crime will cause roughly similar injuries to the 
physical safety and material possessions of the victim. But the in-
jury to the bias crime victim's autonomy - in terms of his sense of 
control over his life - and to his personal dignity will exceed that 
inflicted upon the parallel assault victim. This is clear from the far 
greater occurrence of depression, withdrawal, anxiety, and feelings 
of helplessness and isolation among bias crime victims than is ordi-
narily experienced by assault victims.189 
Moreover, the target community and society suffer greater con-
sequences from bias crimes than from parallel crimes. A parallel 
crime may cause concern or even sorrow among certain members of 
the victim's community, but it would be unusual for that impact to 
reach a level at which it would negatively affect their living stan-
dard. By contrast, bias crimes spread fear and intimidation beyond 
the immediate victims to those who share only racial characteristics 
with the victims. Members of the target group suffer injuries simi-
lar to those felt by the actual victim.19° Unlike the sympathetic 
nonvictims of a parallel crime, members of the target community 
186. Cf. supra note 97 and accompanying text. I omit domestic violence from this cate-
gory of parallel assault. Domestic violence shares many characteristics with bias crimes, in 
terms of both the culpability of the perpetrator and the impact on the victim. A full explora-
tion of the relationship between domestic violence and bias crimes is beyond the scope of this 
article, but it is certainly a question that deserves serious attention. 
187. See supra section l.B.1. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 155-69. 
189. See Levin, supra note 64, at 166; Weiss, supra note 91, at 182-83; Henneberger, supra 
note 92, at 113; Kleinfield, supra note 92, at B2; see also Weiss et al., supra note 93, at 28-29. 
190. See KARMEN, supra note 105, at 262-63; Kelly et al., supra note 3, at 26; Matsuda, 
supra note 6, at 2330-31; see also supra text accompanying note 105. 
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will suffer a living-standard loss in terms of a threat to dignity and 
autonomy and a perceived threat to physical safety. Bias crimes 
therefore cause a greater harm to a society's collective living stan-
dard than do parallel crimes. 
According to Herbert Packer, "[I]t is inescapable that ... some 
offenses are to be taken more seriously than others and that the 
severity of the available punishment should be proportioned to the 
seriousness with which the offense is viewed."191 Because bias 
crimes are more serious than most parallel crimes, it is equally ines-
capable that bias crimes warrant enhanced criminal punishment 
over those penalties that apply to parallel crimes. 
III. ATTRIBUTION OF GUILT FOR BIAS CRIMES 
Having argued above that bias crimes ought to receive more se-
vere punishment than parallel crimes, I now turn to the definition 
and critical elements of a bias crime. Section III.A returns to the 
relationship between culpability and harm discussed in Part II but 
does so in the context of understanding individual guilt. Whereas 
the seriousness of bias crimes generally justifies the enhanced pun-
ishment of these crimes collectively, the harm to a particular victim 
does not, in and of itself, warrant the conclusion that a particular 
perpetrator is guilty of a bias crime. Bias motivation of the perpe-
trator, and not necessarily the resulting harm to the victim, is the 
critical factor in determining an individual's guilt for a bias crime. 
For the purposes of section III.A, bias motivation may entail either 
racial animus or discriminatory selection. 
Section III.B applies the focus on bias motivation to the two 
models of bias crimes developed in Part I - the discriminatory se-
lection model and the racial animus model. This section argues that 
the discriminatory selection model of bias crimes, upheld in Wis-
consin v. Mitchell, is inferior to the racial animus model as a de-
scription of those offenses that warrant enhanced punishment. 
Discriminatory selection of a victim may often provide important 
evidence of racial animus, but selection alone is insufficient for bias 
crime guilt. 
A. The Crucial Role of the Offender's Mental State in 
Determining Guilt or Innocence 
The result of the criminal conduct alone does not ultimately tell 
us much concerning the guilt or innocence of an actor accused of a 
191. PACKER, supra note 122, at 143. 
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bias crime. The most compelling basis for deciding whether an indi-
vidual has committed a bias crime lies in the mental state of the 
actor. This section uses general criminal law principles to justify a 
focus on mental state and applies those conclusions to the particular 
context of bias crimes. 
The modem trend in the study of criminal law, as noted 
above,192 has been toward a focus on the state of mind or culpabil-
ity of the accused. Punishment theorists - retributivists and utili-
tarians alike - have generally considered guilt or innocence to be 
critically linked to the actor's mental state. If the focus concerning 
guilt is shifted from the accused's culpability to the results of his 
conduct, then guilt is triggered by events and circumstances that 
may be beyond his control. The occurrence of harmful results is 
often fortuitous and therefore outside the realm of that which pro-
vides a justifiable indication of the actor's blameworthiness.193 
A result-oriented focus is particularly inappropriate for deter-
mining guilt in the context of bias crimes. In many cases, the harms 
associated with a bias crime depend entirely on whether the victim, 
the target group, and the society perceive the perpetrator's bias mo-
tivation. But in most cases, a perpetrator will have little control 
over the perceptions of others; the victim, the target group, and the 
community may mistakenly perceive a bias motive when none is 
present, and they might fail to perceive a bias motive that is in fact 
really there.194 Accordingly, the criminal law should not focus on 
the results of a perpetrator's actions when deciding whether he has 
committed a bias crime. Rather, the law should focus on the ac-
cused's mental state. Society refuses to punish a person who has 
caused a truly accidental death, but it does punish the murderer, 
even though both persons' actions have caused a loss of life. Nor 
192. See supra text accompanying notes 140-146 (discussing the focus on the actor's cul-
pability for punishment under both retributive theories of punishment and utilitarian 
theories). 
193. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, MoRAL LUCK 20-39 (1981) (analyzing the role of contin-
gencies in making moral assessments); FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 6.6.5, at 479; Kenneth 
Simons, Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay, 81 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 447, 504-06 (arguing that results occurring by accident negate 
intention); see also Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2203-04. 
194. Those who have argued for a harms-based guilt standard have dealt primarily if not 
exclusively witb tbe civil context, which permits a focus on the harm caused and the need to 
compensate tbe victim. See, e.g., Delgado, supra note 6. If this view were applied to the 
criminal context, it would allow for tbe punishment of bias crimes solely for the harm caused 
unless tbe defendant could prove tbat tbe offending act was utterly devoid of racial motiva-
tion, so long as the target community perceived tbe act to be racially motivated. This is 
essentially tbe position advocated, for example, in Note, Combatting Racial Violence: A Leg-
islative Proposa~ supra note 10. I reject this application of strict liability principles and radi-
cal burden shifting in tbe criminal context. 
370 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 93:320 
would this outcome change if the victim's family, firmly but incor-
rectly, believed that the accused acted intentionally. Similarly, the 
guilt or innocence of a person accused of a bias crime should turn 
on his mental state, not on the results of his actions. 
Our focus on culpability - that is, the motivation of the bias 
criminal - presents us with three problem cases that warrant fur-
ther analysis: the cases of the Clever Bias Criminal, the Uncon-
scious Racist, and the Unknowingly Offensive Actor. 
The Clever Bias Criminal is aware of the centrality of culpability 
in establishing guilt of a bias crime. He therefore articulates a pretex-
tual, nonbias motivation for an assault that was in fact motivated by 
bias. 
The Unconscious Racist commits an interracial assault that, 
although unconsciously motivated by bias, is without conscious racial 
motivation. He asserts, for example, that the victim improperly 
strayed into his neighborhood and that he would have attacked the 
victim regardless of ethnicity in order to defend his "turf." Unlike the 
Clever Bias Criminal, the Unconscious Racist consciously believes 
this assertion. 
The Unknowingly Offensive Actor seeks to shock or offend the 
community generally but chooses to do so in a manner that is particu-
larly threatening to a certain racial or ethnic group. He defaces public 
property with a swastika because he knows that this public use of a 
societal taboo will shock people in general. He neither intends to of-
fend Jews in particular nor is he even aware of the fact that the swas-
tika has this particularized effect on the Jewish community. 
The least problematic of our three cases is that of the Clever 
Bias Criminal. This case presents strictly an evidentiary problem. 
The prosecution will have to demonstrate bias motivation beyond a 
reasonable doubt; this will often be difficult. The proof problems 
raised by bias motivation, however, are not inherently different 
from those raised by proof of any other motivation. Suppose that a 
state adopts murder for profit as one of the aggravating circum-
stances in its capital sentencing process.195 Profit motivation will 
involve many of the same evidentiary problems as does proof of 
bias motivation. To some extent, the prosecution can prove each 
using circumstantial evidence. For example, evidence that the de-
fendant was paid is certainly probative of profit motivation. But 
proof of murder for gain requires more. The prosecution must 
prove not only that the defendant was compensated for committing 
the murder but also that monetary gain provided the motivation for 
195. See, e.g., MooEL PENAL CooE § 210.6(3)(g) (1962) (providing that the aggravating 
circumstances to be considered include whether the murder "was committed for pecuniary 
gain"). 
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the act. A combination of such factors as the timing and nature of 
the payment along with the payment itself may prove profit motiva-
tion. Similarly, the circumstances of the Clever Bias Criminal's in-
terracial assault may give rise to a strong inference of racial 
motivation. Those circumstances, combined with the nature of the 
assault and statements made by the accused during the assault,196 
may prove bias motivation. Although proof of the defendant's mo-
tivation will often present a serious challenge for the prosecution, 
this fact alone does not justify a result-oriented approach to bias 
crimes. 
The case of the Clever Bias Criminal raises one additional prob-
lem that warrants brief examination. Suppose that the Clever Bias 
Criminal successfully articulates his pretextual nonracial motivation 
not to the jury but rather to the victim and the victim's community. 
Put differently, what should be the result when the victim and the 
target community of a racially motivated assault are unaware that 
the attacker was motivated by bias? One might argue that under 
these circumstances, the actor is not guilty of a bias crime because 
he has not caused the objective harms associated with bias crimes. 
This requirement of actual harm for guilt, however, is miscon-
ceived. As I discussed earlier,197 actual harm has never been a sine 
qua non for guilt, and there is no reason for bias crimes to be an 
exception to this rule. Consider a would-be assassin who places 
what he believes to be a lethal quantity of poison in his victim's 
drink. Unbeknownst to the assassin, the dosage is quite harmless. 
The intended victim is left alive, unaware and completely unaf-
fected by the events. The actor has thus caused no objective harm. 
He is guilty, however, of attempted murder.198 His guilt is 
grounded either in his future dangerousness199 or in his moral 
blameworthiness for this unsuccessful attempt.200 Under either un-
derstanding, it is irrelevant that the intended victim emerged un-
scathed. Similarly, it is irrelevant to the guilt of the Clever Bias 
196. For an example of a case in which the defendant's statements were important evi-
dence of his bias motivation, see W1Sconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 {1993). 
197. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
198. As a further example of this phenomenon, consider the crime of attempted false 
imprisonment. See, e.g., MooEL PENAL CooE § 212.3 (1962) (providing that a person com-
mits a misdemeanor if he knowingly restrains another unlawfully so as to interfere substan-
tially with his liberty). Attempted false imprisonment leaves the victim unaffected because 
the victim never felt falsely imprisoned. 
199. See, e.g., EWING, supra note 123, at 45; PACKER, supra note 122, at 140; see supra 
notes 121-22. 
200. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 113, at 21; Radin, supra note 115, at 1164-69; see supra 
notes 115-17. 
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Criminal that he did not cause the harms caused by completed bias 
crimes. He is guilty of an attempted bias crime. 
The case of the Unconscious Racist raises a far more complex 
problem than that of the Clever Bias Criminal. Unlike the Clever 
Bias Criminal, the reasons proffered by the Unconscious Racist as 
motivation for his conduct are not consciously pretextual.201 Con-
sider the racially charged incident in Bensonhurst, New York, in 
which a group of white youths assaulted Yusef Hawkins, a black 
teenager.202 Many residents of Bensonhurst insisted that the area 
had no racial problems, reasoning instead, "It's not your color. It's 
whether they know you or not."203 Suppose that a jury hearing evi-
dence of this "turf motivation" is fully persuaded that (i) the de-
fendants were consciously motivated by a desire to protect their 
neighborhood from outsiders; (ii) the defendants' unconscious mo-
tivation was to keep African Americans out of their neighborhood; 
and (iii) the defendants were honestly unaware of their unconscious 
motivation. These defendants, as described, are Unconscious Rac-
ists. Should the Unconscious Racist be found guilty of an "uncon-
scious" bias crime? In other words, is guilt of a bias crime 
sufficiently established by a mens rea of unconscious bias motiva-
tion and an actus reus of conduct that in fact causes the resulting 
harm of a bias crime? 
The answer must be "no." For several reasons, the Unconscious 
Racist is not guilty of a bias crime. First, in general, punishment 
based upon a person's unconscious motives runs afoul of the princi-
ple of voluntariness that underpins the criminal law: a person may 
only be punished for what he did of his own volition.204 Professor 
Moore has described this as the "principle of consciousness": "[l]n 
201. There has been a growing recognition of the role of unconscious racism in our un-
derstanding of our society in general and of our legal system in particular. See, e.g., Sheri 
Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 13 CORNELL L. REv. 1016 (1988); 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 {1987). One student author has identified unconscious 
racism as the cause of prosecutorial and investigatory biases against enforcement of bias 
crimes laws. See Hernandez, supra note 10, at 852-55. Unconscious racism has not been 
brought directly to bear on the mens rea of civil rights crimes. Moreover, no one has argued 
that crimes motivated by unconscious racism should be deemed bias crimes. Cf. Note, Com-
batting Racial Violence: A Legislative Proposal, supra note 10, at 1272-75 (advocating shifting 
the burden of proving racial motivation to facilitate prosecution of bias crimes, but advancing 
no argument based upon unconscious racism). 
202. See Andrew Sullivan, The Two Faces of Bensonhurst, NEw REPueuc, July 2, 1990, at 
13-16. 
203. Id. 
204. See MODEL PENAL CooE § 2.01{1) (1962); DRESSLER, supra note 114, § 9.02, at 65; 
FLETCHER, supra note 112, § 10.3.2, at 802-07; HART, supra note 119, at 22-24, 140-45; 
PACKER, supra note 122, at 73-77. 
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order to ascribe fairly responsibility to a person for causing a harm, 
he must have consciously acted intentionally, and to ascribe fairly 
responsibility to a person for attempting to cause a harm, he must 
have acted with that harm as his conscious reason."205 It is one 
thing to punish the Unconscious Racist for assault; he intentionally 
acts to attack his victim and his conscious reason for doing so is to 
hurt the victim. It is quite another thing to punish the Unconscious 
Racist for a bias crime; he did not consciously attack his victim for 
racial reasons, nor is his conscious reason for doing so to inflict the 
particular harms associated with a bias crime. With respect to the 
bias element of his crime, the Unconscious Racist is comparable to 
the paradigmatic case of a sleepwalker who commits a criminal act. 
The sleepwalker is guilty of no crime because his acts are not con-
sidered to be his own.206 
The second reason that the Unconscious Racist should not be 
deemed guilty of a bias crime concerns the evidentiary problems 
that arise relative to the determination of the precise nature of a 
defendant's unconscious. These problems are extremely difficult 
and perhaps unsolvable. Earlier, I dismissed the evidentiary ques-
tions raised with respect to the Clever Bias Criminal because these 
questions are not different from similar proof problems that occur 
in various areas of criminal law.207 But criminal law includes no 
analogy to the proof required in the Unconscious Racist case. No-
where in the criminal law is there an established need to determine 
the unconscious, either as an element of a crime or as an aspect of a 
defense.208 
Finally, the need for reliance upon theories of unconscious rac-
ism in order to prosecute bias crimes effectively may not be as great 
as it may appear. Consider a hypothetical based on the Ben-
sonhurst case. Suppose that, in addition to the proof outlined 
above, the prosecutor of Unconscious Racist II could show that (i) 
the assault was motivated by the victim's status as "outsider"; and 
(ii) to the defendants, the term outsider is a pretext for black -
205. Michael S. Moore, Responsibility and the Unconscious, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1563, 
1621-27 (1980). 
206. See Norval Morris, Somnambulistic Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 
5 RES JuoICATAE 29-32 (1951) (discussing The King v. Cogdon (unreported), in which the 
defendant was acquitted of murder after she killed her daughter while sleepwalking); see also 
James William Cecil Turner, The Mental Element in Crimes at Common Law, in THE Moo-
ERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL LAW 195, 204 (L. Radzinowicz & J.W.C. Turner eds., 1945) 
(collecting situations in which a person accused of a criminal act defended with the argument 
that the conduct was involuntary). 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 195-98. 
208. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW§ 17 (2d ed. 1961). 
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that is, they regard all blacks as "outsiders." Under these circum-
stances, the prosecution has proven a bias crime. In fact, Uncon-
scious Racist II is not really unconscious about his racist motives at 
all. He stands in virtually the same moral position as the Clever 
Bias Criminal. Although his use of a pretext for race is not neces-
sarily driven by a desire to avoid prosecution, Unconscious Racist 
II articulates a pretext that masks what is in fact a conscious bias 
motivation. 
Unconscious Racist II does not, however, comprise all cases of 
the Unconscious Racist. If it appears that "outsider" is not a pre-
text for race but in fact a more complex concept that correlates 
strongly but not perfectly with race, it would be too dangerous an 
invasion into the psyche to construct a case of bias motivation. 
The last of the three special cases is that of the Unknowingly 
Offensive Actor. The Unknowingly Offensive Actor model is based 
upon a growing number of vandalism cases involving the use of 
swastikas that lack any bias motivation. Young offenders in partic-
ular commit these crimes for a "thrill" or in order to shock adults. 
Perpetrators of these crimes do not specifically seek to offend the 
local Jewish community and are unaware that their conduct has this 
effect.209 The Unknowingly Offensive Actor, therefore, consciously 
acts intentionally in a manner that (i) is intended to cause the harm 
associated with a parallel crime of vandalism, but (ii) in fact causes 
the harm associated with a bias crime. 
The Unknowingly Offensive Actor is like the Clever Bias Crimi-
nal and the Unconscious Racist with respect to element (ii) but dif-
fers from the other two with respect to element (i). Unlike the 
Clever Bias Criminal, he truly does not intend to cause the harm of 
a bias crime. Unlike the Unconscious Racist, he does not even in-
tend to do so unconsciously. Has the Unknowingly Offensive Actor 
committed a bias crime? 
Although guilty of the parallel crime of vandalism, the Unknow-
ingly Offensive Actor is not a bias criminal. Most Unknowingly Of-
fensive Actors fall into either of two categories: the Unknowingly 
Offensive Actor (Unlucky) and the Unknowingly Offensive Actor 
209. See Donald P. Green & Robert P. Abelson, Understanding Hate Crime: A Case 
Study of North Carolina {Apr. 20, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, part of a working paper 
series for the Institution for Social and Policy Studies at Yale University) (suggesting that 
some bias crimes are manifestations of generalized juvenile delinquency rather than directed 
expressions of animus or hostility toward the target group). The phenomenon of the Un-
knowingly Offensive Actor is captured by Jack Levin's apt and colorful phrase, " '1\venty 
years ago they might have stolen hubcaps. Today they spray-paint a swastika on a build-
ing.'" Anthony Flint, Swastikas Often a Tool of Shock Not Hate, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 
1994, at 13 (quoting Northeastern University Professor Jack Levin). 
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(Negligent). The Unknowingly Offensive Actor (Unlucky) is a van-
dal who, by fortuity, selects a means of vandalism that creates a 
harm normally associated with a bias crime. He cannot become a 
bias criminal merely by the accident of picking a swastika as the 
mark by which he will deface property if, as we hypothesize, he 
truly does not know the impact of this symbol.210 Under this hy-
pothesis, the Unknowingly Offensive Actor cannot be blamed for 
his crime beyond the blame that attaches to a case of simple 
vandalism. 
The Unknowingly Offensive Actor (Negligent), by contrast, is 
not blameless. Even if he did not know the meaning and impact of 
the swastika, he should have known. The blame that attaches to the 
conduct of the Unknowingly Offensive Actor (Negligent), however, 
is on a different and lower level from that of the true bias criminal. 
He is not blameworthy for committing a racially motivated act of 
vandalism. At most, he has been negligent concerning his aware-
ness of the symbols he uses.211 This negligence is insufficient culpa-
bility to support guilt for the commission of a bias crime.212 
Guilt of a bias crime turns on the culpability of the actor - that 
is, on his bias motivation - and not on the results of his conduct. 
The problems raised by the Clever Bias Criminal, the Unconscious 
Racist, and the Unknowingly Offensive Actor require no contrary 
result. But the question remains, what is the nature of bias motiva-
210. See supra text accompanying notes 182-95 (discussing limitations of result-oriented 
punishment generally and specifically with respect to the punishment of bias crimes); 
FLETCHER, supra note 112, §§ 3.1.1, 6.65, at 115-18, 472-83 (arguing that result-oriented pun-
ishment is inappropriate for certain crimes). 
211. By definition, the behavior of the Unknowingly Offensive Actor (Negligent) does 
not reach the level of recklessness with respect to the elements of a bias crime. Reckless 
conduct, under the Model Penal Code, is action taken with a conscious disregard of the likeli-
hood of the harm. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(c) (1962). By hypothesis, the Unknow-
ingly Offensive Actor has not consciously disregarded the possibility that the swastika will 
have a particularized harm on Jews. At most, he has behaved negligently. Under the Model 
Penal Code, a person is criminally negligent with respect to an element of a crime when his 
failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the element exists "involves a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's 
situation." MoDEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(2)(d) (1962). 
Given the findings of Professors Green and Abelson's study, see Green & Abelson, supra 
note 209, the Unknowingly Offensive Actor's ignorance of the meaning of the swastika may 
constitute a gross deviation from what the reasonable person in his situation would know. In 
any event, the highest level of culpability that the Unknowingly Offensive Actor exhibits with 
respect to a bias crime is that of criminal negligence. 
212. At most, the Unknowingly Offensive Actor (Negligent) could be charged with some 
low level of bias crime. There is no jurisdiction with a bias crime law that requires only 
negligence with respect to the element of racial motivation. I have argued elsewhere that the 
mens rea requirement for bias crimes ought to be the requisite mens rea for the parallel 
crime and the purpose to commit a bias crime - that is, conscious racial motivation. See 
Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs, supra note 4, at 2209-10. 
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tion? Thus far in the discussion, I have not distinguished between 
bias motivation as animus toward the victim's racial group and bias 
motivation as discriminatory selection of the victim based on race. 
It is to this question - the relative merits of the racial animus and 
the discriminatory selection models of bias crimes - that I now 
tum. 
B. Analyzing the Discriminatory Selection Model and the 
Racial Animus Model of Bias Crimes 
The two models of bias crimes differ as to the role racial animus 
plays, if any, in defining the elements of the crime. The racial ani-
mus model defines these crimes on the basis of the perpetrator's 
animus toward the racial group of the victim and the centrality of 
this animus in the perpetrator's motivation for committing the 
crime.213 The discriminatory selection model defines these crimes 
solely with reference to the perpetrator's choice of victim on the 
basis of the victim's race.214 
Any case that would meet the requirements of the racial animus 
model would necessarily also satisfy those of the discriminatory se-
lection model because a crime motivated by animus toward the vic-
tim's racial group will necessarily be one in which the victim was 
discriminatorily selected on this basis. The reverse is not true. 
Cases of discriminatory selection need not be based upon racial ani-
mus. Two hypothetical cases will illustrate the point that some 
cases could fall within a discriminatory selection model statute but 
outside a statute of the racial animus model. 
The Purse Snatcher is a thief who preys exclusively upon women 
because he believes that he will better achieve his criminal goals by 
grabbing purses from women than by trying to pick wallets out of 
th~ pockets of men. The Purse Snatcher discriminatorily selects his 
victims on the basis of gender. Nonetheless, he has no animus 
toward women as a group, and his thefts are not motivated by any 
attitudes about women other than the manner in which they carry 
their valuables.215 The Violent Show-Off is based on the hypotheti-
cal proposed by the Attorney General of Wisconsin during the oral 
argument to the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.216 Sup-
213. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17, 61-72. 
214. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15, 52-57. 
215. The hypothetical of the Purse Snatcher assumes that we are in a jurisdiction that 
includes gender as one of the categories protected by its bias crime statute. See supra note 
13. 
216. See supra note 57. 
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pose that Todd Mitchell's sole motivation in selecting a white victim 
was to impress his friends, and that Mitchell himself was otherwise 
indifferent as to the choice of his victim. If this were the case, 
Mitchell's selection of Riddick would have been racially based, but 
the selection itself would not have been based on any animus 
toward white people. Has either the Purse Snatcher or the Violent 
Show-Off committed a bias crime? 
As a matter of positive law, both the Purse Snatcher and the 
Violent Show-Off are guilty under the Wisconsin discriminatory se-
lection model bias crime statute, and both are innocent under the 
New Jersey racial animus model bias crime statute.217 As a norma-
tive issue, the Purse Snatcher should not be deemed a bias criminal 
and the Violent Show-Off, depending on the circumstances of his 
offense, may not be. The discriminatory selection model thus over-
reaches in instances such as the two cases under consideration. 
The Purse Snatcher easily demonstrates the distinctions be-
tween the two models of bias crimes and the shortcomings of a dis-
criminatory selection model. The Purse Snatcher acts with no 
animus toward his victim's group. From either a retributive or utili-
tarian perspective, the Purse Snatcher should not be punished for a 
bias crime. 
Punishing the Purse Snatcher not only for the theft but also for a 
bias crime would place him on the same moral plane as someone 
who targets women out of a violent expression of misogyny. Even 
if the harms caused by the two criminals are similar, their culpabil-
ity is distinct. For a retributivist, the difference in culpability be-
tween that of the Purse Snatcher and the violent misogynist 
translates into a similar difference in blame: the Purse Snatcher is 
less blameworthy than the violent misogynist and deserves a lesser 
punishment. Put differently, the Purse Snatcher deserves to be 
punished for the theft but not for a bias crime. The same claim may 
be maintained from a consequentialist point of view. The appropri-
ate deterrence for the Purse Snatcher is neither more nor less than 
the deterrence appropriate for any other common thief. If the de-
fendant were a bias criminal, his misogynistic drive to commit his 
crime would require greater deterrence and thus warrant greater 
punishment. Under either approach to punishment, therefore, the 
culpability of the violent misogynist is directly related to the factors 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57, 61-62. The "innocence" of the Purse 
Snatcher and the Violent Show-Off, of course, refers only to charges under a bias crime law. 
Each is guilty of a parallel crime - theft for the Purse Snatcher and assault for the Violent 
Show-Off. 
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that make bias crimes more serious than parallel crimes, whereas 
the culpability of the Purse Snatcher does not implicate those fac-
tors. Because a discriminatory selection model bias crime statute 
would punish the Purse Snatcher as a bias criminal, it must be 
flawed. 
The Violent Show-Off raises a harder set of issues. He has 
much in common with the Unknowingly Offensive Actor, who 
should not be held criminally liable for the commission of a bias 
crime.218 The Violent Show-Off's purpose is to assault a victim in a 
manner that will impress his friends. To him, it is of no importance 
that the manner itself calls for the discriminatory selection of a vic-
tim. The racially discriminatory dimension of the Violent Show-
Off 's act is unconnected to the purpose of his conduct. 
There is a distinction between the Violent Show-Off and the 
Unknowingly Offensive Actor that appears on first examination to 
call for the former's bias crime liability. Whereas the Unknowingly 
Offensive Actor was unaware that his conduct would cause a fo-
cused harm on a particular racial group, the Violent Show-Off 
knows full well that he is seeking out a member of a particular ra-
cial group to do harm. Recall that the Unknowingly Offensive Ac-
tor sought to shock everyone; his means of doing so was to draw a 
swastika. Suppose that he sought not to shock the general commu-
nity but to shock the Jewish community in particular and that his 
means of doing so was to deface a synagogue with a swastika. Sup-
pose further that he then argued that he did so only to impress his 
friends and not out of any animosity toward Jews. The Unknow-
ingly Offensive Actor has now become the Violent Show-Off - but 
is he liable for a bias crime? He is not, and the key to understand-
ing why lies in first understanding why the question is not as diffi-
cult as it first appears. 
The difficulty in acquitting the Unknowingly Offensive Actor of 
a bias crime when he chooses not only to paint a swastika but also 
to target a synagogue for his crime stems from the fact that it is 
difficult to believe that he sincerely lacked racial animus. The loca-
tion of a swastika is often the key to determining whether a particu-
lar act of vandalism was racially motivated or mere thrill seeking.219 
Discriminatory selection of a victim is often powerful evidence of 
218. See supra text accompanying notes 209-12. 
219. See Green & Abelson, supra note 209, at 22 (noting that the factors used to deter-
mine whether vandalism involving the use of swastikas represents an anti-Semitic attack, as 
opposed to an attempt to shock adults generally, include accompanying messages of intimida-
tion and location of the graffiti in Jewish cemeteries or synagogues, or in Jewish·owned 
homes). 
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racial animus toward the victim's group. But a Violent Show-Off 
may truly act without animus. In this case, he appears to be a bias 
criminal only because of the choice of means by which his friends 
will be impressed. Nevertheless, the substance of the friends' 
choice, which is irrelevant to the Violent Show-Off's purpose, can-
not transform his culpability into that necessary for a bias crime.220 
A further level of refinement in this hypothetical, however, con-
founds such a straightforward theoretical disposition. This level of 
refinement springs from questioning the supposition that underpins 
the Violent Show-Off - namely, that he truly acts without racial 
animus. We must ask whether this is possible. On the surface, the 
Violent Show-Off could sincerely state that he bears no ill will 
toward the racial group he selects. Beneath this assertion, however, 
is his knowledge that his friends do bear such animus and his will-
ingness to proceed with the crime under these circumstances. 
Viewed in this manner, the nexus between the Violent Show-Off 
and racial animus is sufficiently close to distinguish him from the 
Unknowingly Offensive Actor and to make him guilty of a bias 
crime. His knowledge of the animus that ultimately drives his vio-
lent act may allow the inference that he has acted purposely with 
regard to a racially motivated attack.221 But the Violent Show-Off 
is a bias criminal only if he meets the elements of a racial animus 
model statute. If he is separated from the racial animus of his 
friends, then he is identical to the Unknowingly Offensive Actor 
and similarly not guilty of a bias crime. 
The guilt of the Violent Show-Off, however conceived, is sepa-
rate from that of his friends, for they may very well be guilty of bias 
crimes. Suppose that the Violent Show-Off's friends encourage 
him to select a victim of a particular race out of animus for that 
group. They are guilty of solicitation or complicity in the commis-
sion of a bias crime.222 The Violent Show-Off, however, lacks the 
animus of his accomplices and thus does not share their guilt for the 
bias crime.223 He is guilty only of the lesser-included parallel of-
fense that he intended to commit. 
220. See supra text accompanying notes 192-94. 
221. See, e.g., People v. Beeman, 199 Cal. Rptr. 60, 67 (1984) ("An act which has the 
effect of giving aid and encouragement, and which is done with knowledge of the criminal 
purpose of the person aided, may indicate that the actor intended to assist in fulfillment of 
the known criminal purpose. However ••. the act may be done with some other purpose 
which precludes criminal liability."). 
222. See MODEL PENAL CooE §§ 2.06, 5.02 (1962). See generally Herbert Wechsler et al., 
The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: 
Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 CoLUM. L. REv. 571 (1961). 
223. See DRESSLER, supra note 114, §§ 29.05, 30.05, at 384-85, 422-23. 
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The racial animus model of bias crimes more appropriately de-
fines a bias crime. Many cases of discriminatory victim selection 
are in fact also cases of racial animus; most cases in which the per-
petrator selected his victim on the basis of race may fit comfortably 
within both models. This demonstrates the continued significance 
of discriminatory selection in a bias crime regime that embraces the 
racial animus model. Discriminatory selection may often act as per-
suasive evidence of racial animus that may not be proven by any 
other means. A showing of discriminatory selection of a victim will 
often be powerful evidence for the much more subtle and difficult 
showing of racial animus. But discriminatory selection is only evi-
dence of racial animus. If we know that discriminatory selection 
exists without animus in a particular case, then the selection ought 
not be used as a surrogate for racial animus and should not be pun-
ished.224 As we punish bias crimes, we must understand precisely 
what we are punishing: purposeful, conscious criminal conduct 
grounded in the racial animus of the perpetrator. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been forty years since Gordon Allport asked whether 
America would continue to make progress toward tolerance and 
stand as a "staunch defender of the right to be the same or differ-
ent," or whether "a fatal retrogression [would] set in."225 Laws that 
identify racially motivated violence for enhanced punishment are 
only one means of answering Allport's call, but they do constitute a 
critical element in the defense of the "right to be the same or differ-
ent." Racially motivated violence is different from other forms of 
violence. Bias crimes are worse than parallel crimes. They are 
worse in a manner that is relevant to setting levels of criminal pun-
ishment. The unique harms caused by bias crimes not only justify 
their enhanced punishment but compel it. 
224. An alternative use of the discriminatory selection model that I neither endorse nor 
reject is that discriminatory victim selection, in the absence of racial animus, might be seen as 
a lower grade of bias crime than true cases of racial animus. Under this approach, discrimi-
natory selection would amount to a wrong in and of itself but a wrong of less seriousness than 
that of racial animus. 
A more promising alternative lies in allowing discriminatory selection in the absence of 
racial animus to give rise to civil but not criminal liability. This approach is similar to the civil 
liability in other civil rights contexts - liability predicated upon unintentional conduct with 
discriminatory results. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 78, at 956-59 (arguing that discriminatory 
intent for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause requires neither animus nor conscious 
awareness of discrimination). 
225. ALLPORT, supra note 2, at 518. 
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Bias crime laws ought to single out criminal conduct that is mo-
tivated by racial animus. Discriminatory selection of a victim will 
ordinarily be part of racial animus. Indeed, the proof of animus in 
the prosecution of a bias crime will likely begin with evidence relat-
ing to victim selection. Elements of proof, however, must not be 
confused with the gravamen of the crime. The gravamen of a bias 
crime is the animus of the accused. 
The punishment of hate will not end racial hatred in society. If, 
however, the United States is to be a "staunch defender of the right 
to be the same or different," it cannot desist from this task. 
